Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking by Seidenfeld, Mark




Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and
Comment Rulemaking
Mark Seidenfeld
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Administrative Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking,
75 Tex. L. Rev. 483 (1997),
Available at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/8
? ???? ?????
Citation: 75 Tex. L. Rev.  483 1996-1997 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Tue Feb 24 10:14:58 2015
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0040-4411
Texas Law Review
Volume 75, Number 3, February 1997
Articles
Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and
Comment Rulemaking
Mark Seidenfeld*
Articles lamenting the recent "ossification" of notice and comment
rulemaking seem to be the fashion in administrative law scholarship
today.' The term "ossification" refers to the inefficiencies that plague
regulatory programs because of analytic hurdles that agencies must clear
in order to adopt new rules.2 To a large extent, developments in adminis-
trative law over the past two decades that were meant to expand public
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. B.A. 1975, Reed
College; M.A. 1979, Brandeis University; J.D. 1983, Stanford University. I would like to thank Rob
Atkinson, Jim Chen, Dan Gifford, Adam Hirsch, Lars Noah, and Jim Rossi for insightful comments
on earlier drafts of this Article, and Bill Clague and Kathy Johnson for their dedicated research.
1. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 225-54
(1990); JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION 7-16 (1988);
RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review ofAgency Rules: How Federal Courts
Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1991); Terrence M.
Scanlon & Robert A. Rogowsky, Back-Door Rulemaking: A View from the CPSC, REG., July/Aug.
1984, at 27; see also Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal
Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 763, 764, 764-65
(citing studies expressing concern that judicial review has "deterred systematic policymaking" at
numerous agencies).
2. Don Elliot appears to have been the first to apply the phrase "ossification" to the resulting
burdens on the rulemaking process. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-86 (1992) (citing E. Donald Elliot, Remarks at the
Symposium, Assessing the Environmental Protection Agency After Twenty Years: Law, Politics and
Economics, at Duke University School of Law (Nov. 15, 1990)).
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participation and influence in administrative decisionmaking have uninten-
tionally put these hurdles in place.3 Much of the current academic litera-
ture on administrative law has focused on identifying ways to lower these
hurdles.4
When Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act5 (APA) in
1946, notice and comment rulemaking was meant to allow an agency to
adopt rules quickly and easily.' The procedures were suited to the
legislative-type action of prospectively setting standards;7 they allowed the
public to know about and participate in the formulation of the standards,
but left the agency free to act without having to convene formal, trial-type
hearings! To distinguish this mechanism for rulemaking from trial-type
procedures, scholars have even referred to notice and comment procedures
as "infbrmal rulemaking."9
Over the past two decades, the process of adopting rules has become
more complex."0 Although judges are not free to add procedures to those
Congress requires under the APA and an agency's enabling statute,"
courts remain free to demand exacting explanations for agency action under
the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review.'2 Such judicial
demands create great uncertainty for an agency seeking to adopt a rule
3. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION 44-54 (1988); see also Robert L. Rabin, FederalRegulation in Historical Perspective,
38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1295-1315 (1986) (detailing how judicial concerns about public access to and
influence in agency regulatory processes developed into a requirement of stringent explanation
standards).
4. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment ofAgency Rulemaking: An Essay on
Management, Games, and Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring 1994, at 185;
McGarity, supra note 2, at 1436-62; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995).
5. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, §§ 2-10, 12, 60 Stat. 237, 237-44 (1946), amended by
Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 381, 383-88, 392-93 (1966) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,
701-706 (1994)).
6. See Rabin, supra note 3, at 1265 ("[T]he APA rulemaking scheme is notable primarily for the
absence of constraint it places on agency officials."); Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72
VA. L. REV. 447, 452-54 (1986) (noting that the rulemaking provisions of the APA predominantly
reflect the New Deal belief in unfettered agency discretion).
7. See Ronald A. Cass, Models ofAdministrative Action, 72 VA. L. REv. 363, 364 (1986) (noting
that the APA's rulemaking procedure "loosely resembles the legislative process"); cf Shapiro, supra
note 6, at 453 (contending that although rulemaking is quasi-legislative in nature, the APA does not
require as many formal safeguards for rulemaking as Congress usually provides as part of its own legis-
lative process).
8. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (specifying that, to enact legislative rules, agencies need only
publish notice in the Federal Register, allow written comments, publish final rules at least 30 days
before they take effect, and provide "a concise general statement of their basis and purpose"); see also
Shapiro, supra note 6, at 453 (contrasting formal adjudicatory and informal legislative rulemaking
procedures).
9. See PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 159 (1989).
10. See McGarity, supra note 2, at 1385.
11. See Vermont YankeeNuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978).
12. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
484 [Vol. 75:483
Demystifying Deossification
because the agency cannot know in advance what issues and arguments a
reviewing court will deem to warrant extended analysis and explanation.13
According to several scholars, judicial demands for such explanations, and
the attendant uncertainty these demands create, have caused agencies to
perfbrm detailed analyses even of matters the agency considers peripheral
to the decision at hand. 4
The literature recognizes that the judiciary is not alone in demanding
more rigorous analysis of agency rulemaking than was envisioned at the
inception of the APA.15 Congress has demanded that agencies prepare
environmental impact statements before taking any action that threatens
significantly to affect any aspect of the human environment.1 6 Statutes
also require agencies to analyze regulations to ensure that they do not
impose undue burdens on small businesses.1 7 In the past decade, the
White House has taken a prominent place alongside Congress and the
courts, demanding that agencies perform "regulatory impact analyses"-
that is, detailed cost-benefit studies-for every rule that has a major impact
on the American economy. 8
Nonetheless, several scholars seem to lay most of the blame for ossifi-
cation on judicially created administrative law doctrines.19 Judicial review
13. See R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 245,
247 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the
District of Columbia Circuit and JudicialDeterrence ofAgency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300,302-
03 (both asserting that the risk of reversal of rulemakings due to reasons an agency cannot predict or
control will deter rulemaking generally).
14. As Tom McGarity so aptly put it: "Because [agencies] can never know what issues dissatisfied
litigants will raise on appeal, [agencies] must attempt to prepare responses to all contentions that may
prove credible to an appellate court, no matter how ridiculous they may appear to agency staff."
McGarity, supra note2, at 1412 (emphasis added); see also E. Donald Elliot, Re-InventingRulemaking,
41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492-93 (1992) (asserting that the primary purpose of notice and comment pro-
ceedings is to allow agencies to develop a record for judicial review, not to collect relevant information
from interested parties); Melnick, supra note 13, at 247 (asserting that agencies accumulated informa-
tion and responded to comments primarily to defend against the uncertainty of judicial review).
15. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 4, at 204-07; McGarity, supra note 2, at 1397; Pierce, supra
note 4, at 62-65.
16. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1994).
17. See Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-603 (1994).
18. Executive oversight and some sort of cost analysis of regulations date back to President
Nixon's "Quality of Life" review program underthe auspices of the Office of Managementand Budget
(OMB). See GEORGE C. EADs & MICHAEL Fix, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY
DILEMMA 46-48 (1984). President Reagan greatly increased the scope of White House oversight of
agency rulemaking by requiring that all agencies except the independent commissions perform regula-
tory impact analyses (RIAs) on their proposed rules and refrain from issuing rules that the analyses
concluded were not cost justified. See Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127 § 3 (1981). Reagan's
Executive Order authorized the OMB to review agency RIAs of rules. Id. Although President Clinton
substantially modified the scope and procedure of White House review of rules, he retained the require-
ment of cost-benefit analyses for major rules, and for OMB oversight of those analyses. See Exec.
Order No. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638 §§ 2-4 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West 1996).
19. See Mashaw, supra note 4, at 200-04; Patricia M. Wald, The 1993 Justice Lester W. Roth
Lecture-Regulation at Risk- Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L.
19971
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under the hard look test magnifies the regulatory inertia created by analytic
or substantive requirements imposed on the rulemaking process by statute
or executive order.' ° Even if required analyses, such as environmental
and regulatory impact statements, are not subject to substantive judicial
review,21 by providing detailed data and reasons for an agency decision,
they can fuel a more exhaustive effort by a court reviewing the ultimate
agency action under the APA or the agency's substantive statute. Hence,
such review encourages an agency to perform more thorough analyses than
it otherwise might. For example, the authority of reviewing courts to
enforce the ostensibly procedural requirement that an environmental impact
statement (EIS) consider all reasonable alternatives to a proposed action has
resulted in comprehensive consideration of some alternatives that the
agency otherwise might never have considered.' In addition, courts have
used the information uncovered by the EIS process to question the overall
validity of agency action under the hard look standard. 3
Scholars have bemoaned the ossification of rulemaking primarily for
two reasons. First, agencies' belief that they must devote an inordinate
amount of their resources to each rulemaking proceeding hampers their
willingness and ability to issue regulations to the extent warranted by the
problems within their jurisdictions. In fact, agencies such as the
REV. 621,\ 626 (1994); see also, e.g., Melnick, supra note 13, at 246 (arguing that "judicial
intervention has had an unfortunate effect on policy-making," burdening agencies with "delay and
uncertainty"); Pierce, supra note 13, at 327 (attributing agency reticence in adopting rules to the effects
of judicial review and the polarity of the D.C. Circuit); Paul R. Verkuil, Comment: Rulenaking
Ossification-A Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 453, 457-59 (1995) (arguing for fast-track legis-
lative oversight as a method to overcome ossification in rulemaking).
20. The hard look test is described at infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
21. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,227-28 (1980) (per
curiam) (holding that the National En-vironmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not authorize a reviewing
court to reallocate the substantive balance between environmental impacts and other factors made by
an agency); Exec. Order No. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638 § 10 (1994) (specifying that the Executive Order
on Regulatory Planning and Review does not create any right of judicial review).
22. See City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 915 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1990) (remanding the
National Forest Service's issuance of a five-year operating plan for harvesting timber because the
Service failed to consider amending timber contracts as an alternative in its environmental impact
statement (EIS)); California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767-68 (9th Cir. 1982) (ordering the National
Forest Service to consider allocating more land to wilderness in its EIS).
23. See, e.g., AudubonSoc'yv. Dailey, 761 F. Supp. 640, 649-50 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (enjoining
any action on a fill permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers because the Corps's conclusion
regarding the impact of the project on traffic flatly contradicted information gathered as part of the
environmental assessment), affrd 977 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land,
760 F. Supp. 345, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (enjoining the construction of a post office because the envi-
ronmental assessment indicated that the building was totally out of character with its surroundings and
observing that the Postal Service's conclusion that the building's environmental impact would not be
significant because it was "'designed and landscaped to soften its visual impact' . . . amountled] to
putting a tutu on an elephant and calling it a ballerina"); City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392
F. Supp. 578, 592, 592-94 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (enjoining federal participation in building a new airport
runway because the EIS's assumption that 85dB(A) is an acceptable noise level failed to "conform to
what is scientifically known about the effect of noise on humans").
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) do not even have sufficient re-
sources to enact the rules that their authorizing statutes mandate.2
Several studies of the regulatory process purport to show how, in particular
instances, agencies have shied away from highly beneficial regulations
because of a fear that the regulations will not pass judicial muster.' At
least one prognosticator has gone so far as to predict a regulatory catas-
trophe because he sees current administrative law doctrines as creating
insurmountable barriers to agencies setting standards by any means.'
Second, the ossification of the rulemaking process leads agencies to
favor setting standards by means regarded as less appropriate than rule-
making. 7  Agencies can set standards within adjudicatory proceedings. 28
By doing so, however, agencies lose the insights that come from allowing
affected entities to comment on the standards. The parties also may find
themselves unexpectedly subject to standards that they have not prepared
24. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: NEw APPROACH NEEDED TO
MANAGE THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT 74-75 (1988) (reporting that as of April
1988, the EPA had met only 15 of 66 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) statutory
deadlines); see also ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 667-69 (1992) (explaining why the EPA could not complete rulemakings required by
RCRA until 12 years after some of the statutory deadlines had passed).
25. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note I, at 10-11 (summarizing the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration's (NHTSA) avoidance of timely rulemaking and its resulting abdication of
automobile safety design regulation); R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 192, 190-92 (1983) (concluding that "the greater the burdens placed on the
EPA in its formal dealing with states and sources, the greater the agency's incentives to develop
informal agreements" with industry regarding industry's compliance with the Clean Air Act); Sidney
A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative
Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13-14 (1989) (arguing that OSHA's slow pace of regulating chemicals
in the workplace has resulted in large part from the burdens imposed on it by judicial review).
26. See Pierce, supra note 1, at 10-11 (predicting electricity shortages due to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's (FERC) unwillingness to engage in rulemaking to restructure the electric
utility industry).
27. See McGarity, supra note 2, at 1386 ("[A]gencies are beginning to seek out alternative, less
participatory regulatory vehicles to circumvent the increasingly stiff and formalized structures of the
informal rulemaking process."); see also Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball':
NLRB Policymaking and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 413-18 (1995)
(describing how the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) practice of setting policy by adjudi-
cation, along with disingenuous factfinding, makes judicial control over that policy more difficult);
MASHAW & HARFSr, supra note 1, at 149-65 (detailing NHTSA's focus on recalls as an alternative
to its failed rulemaking attempts). But cf. Rossi, supra note 1, at 793, 803-06 (questioning whether
aggressive judicial review is responsible for FERC's use of adjudication to move towards deregulation
of electricity generation, and noting that FERC's adjudicatory approach in this context might be
effective).
28. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947). In NLRB v. BellAerospace Co.,
416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974), the Supreme Court held that an agency's choice to develop a general stan-
dard by adjudication was reviewable for abuse of discretion. The Court, however, did not require the
agency to explain its choice, and the Court's analysis of circumstances surrounding the use of adjudi-
cation in Chenery and Bell Aerospace indicates that, practically speaking, the agency's choice of proce-
dural mode is unfettered. Id.
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to meet. Worse yet, agencies can use even more informal means than no-
tice and comment rulemaking to specify new standards.29 Agencies today
frequently issue policy statements announcing the circumstances under
which they intend to enforce statutes and existing regulations.' Such
announcements can have the practical effect of coercing compliance with
the policy statements by entities eager to ensure that they will not be
subject to enforcement proceedings and potential penalties for statutory or
regulatory violations." Although the APA requires that an agency pub-
lish such statements before relying on them to the detriment of private
entities,32 the APA mandates no procedures to ensure opportunity for any
public participation in the formulation of such statements. No formal
provision for political oversight of announcements of intended agency
policy exists, and because such announcements frequently address detailed
issues that affect select classes of entities, the White House and Congress
tend merely to glance over them.3 Similarly, because a policy statement,
unlike a legislative rule, has no legal impact in its own right, a court is less
likely to entertain challenges to the substance of such a statement prior to
the agency's application of the policy in an adjudicatory context.' In
29. See Robert A. Anthony, "Well, You Want the Permit, Don't You?"Agency Efforts to Make
Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 31-33 (1992) (describing the use
of policy statements and guidelines to set practically, although not legally, binding norms); Michael
Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulernaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DuKE L.J. 381, 383-84 (noting that
the distinction between legislative rules and nonlegislative rules is hazy because both have coercive
impact on those subject to them); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DuKE L.J. 1463,
1466 (1992) (noting that the APA recognizes and governs the adoption of a class of rules that, although
not legally binding, can adversely affect those subject to them).
30. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the
Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE L.J. 1311, 1332-55 (1992)
(reporting numerous instances of agencies using nonlegislative rules purportedly to bind the public).
31. See Anthony, supra note 29, at 33, 32-33 (noting that the statements may constitute
"government by intimidation").
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994). This requirement has led Peter Strauss to label policy statements
and other rules not subject to the APA's notice and comment procedures as "publication rules."
STPAUSS, supra note 9, at 157.
33. Cf. Strauss, supra note 29, at 1472 (noting that hard look and political review have focused
on "high-consequence" rulemaking, and that this restricted focus gives agencies an avenue to escape
onerous review by using "publication rules").
34. See Asimow, supra note 29, at 390 n.44. Because rules are final agency decisions, they are
presumptively reviewable immediately after they are issued. Under the administrative law doctrine of
ripeness, however, an agency rule will not be subject to review unless the issues raised in a challenge
are appropriate for judicial review prior to enforcement, and delaying review until after enforcement
will impose a hardship on those potentially subject to the rule. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 148-49 (1967). Courts frequently are not in a good position to review the substance of a publi-
cation rule prior to its application because they do not have before them any record or explanation by
the agency justifying the rule or explaining precisely how it will operate. See Asimow, supra note 29,
at 422 & n.213. Entities potentially subject to the rule also do not face the same hardship as those
subject to a legislative rule because the rule is not legally binding. In light of the rule's nonbinding
nature, the entity can argue that the agency should not apply the rule as written, because factors not
envisioned by the rule render its application to the entity inappropriate. In other words, the agency can
change the rule in response to arguments by the entity, and hence it is uncertain that the rule will apply
488
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short, by using policy statements to coerce compliance with a desired
standard, an agency can circumvent the safeguards the three branches of
government have developed to ensure that the agency's policy is legally,
economically, and politically justified.
Recent scholarship on administrative law's propensity to discourage
agency rulemaking contains numerous suggestions about how to modify the
law to "deossify" the rulemaking process." Given the blame for ossifi-
cation laid at the judiciary's feet, not surprisingly much of this literature
focuses on judicial review of agency rules. Several commentators have
suggested relaxing the hard look test that courts use in evaluating whether
agency decisions are arbitrary and capricious.36 Another scholar advo-
cates delaying judicial review of agency rules, which would significantly
reduce the incentives of regulated entities to challenge rules without first
trying to comply.37
Although I agree with the general thrust of the literature that the
rulemaking process has become unnecessarily cumbersome, I fear that
many of the proposed solutions will do more harm than good. In looking
for solutions to the ossification of rulemaking, commentators have given
short shrift to the original concerns that prompted the administrative law
doctrines that they would abandon. 8 So long as the administrative state
remains such a pervasive and coercive force in society, 9 one should think
to the entity. See Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163 (1967) (holding a legislative rule
unripe for judicial review because future circumstances might lead the agency not to apply the rule to
the petitioner). Hence, under existing doctrine, many publication rules would not be ripe for review
until applied in a particular case. See, e.g., Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 5 F.3d 911,
920 (5th Cir. 1993); American Gas Ass'ns v. FERC, 888 F.2d 136, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1989); American
Trucking Ass'ns v. ICC, 747 F.2d 787, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Strauss, supra note 29, at 1479
("[Judicial] relief from the impact of publication usually iiill be after-the-fact in character . . ..
(emphasis in original)). But ef. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Pefia, 44 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.
1994) (en bane) (holding a Federal Railroad Administration interpretative rule subject to judicial
review), aff'd sub nom. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 116
S. Ct. 595 (1996).
35. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 4, at 249-54; McGarity, supra note 2, at 1436-62; Pierce,
supra note 4, at 59-60.
36. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 2, at 1453; Pierce, supra note 1, at 29.
37. See Mashaw, supra note 4, at 254.
38. Richard Pierce has stated that he is pessimistic that judicial review bestows any significant
benefits on the regulatory process and that he therefore considers "all deossifying changes in doctrine
good." Pierce, supra note 4, at 67, 66-68. Jerry Mashaw acknowledges the need for agencies to give
reasons for their decisions, but, like Pierce, does not believe that the judiciary is the best institution to
review such reasons. See Mashaw, supra note 4, at 251-52. Mashaw bows to hard look review only
because the legal culture in the United States appears to demand it. See id. at 208, 252. Of the three
major proponents ofjudicial-review reform to alleviate ossification of rulemaking, only Tom McGarity
explicitly acknowledges the benefits of juqdicial review. See McGarity, supra note 2, at 1451-52.
Nonetheless, McGarity asserts that "[i t may be time for courts to replace the 'hard look' metaphor with
a more deferential image" without describing how courts might create that new image or analyzing
precisely how that image is likely to affect the quality of agency decisionmaking. Id. at 1453.
39. See JAMEs 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 3-12 (1978) (relating the history of the growth of the administrative state to
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very hard before eliminating legal doctrines that provide checks on the
arbitrariness of agency action. Changes in judicial review suggested of late
by numerous scholars deserve close attention, but I believe that such atten-
tion must not divert the focus entirely away from the need to ensure that
agencies act not only within acceptable legal and political bounds, but also
exercise their discretion in a deliberative manner.40
This Article carefully explores proposals for deossification without
losing sight of the need for checks on agency action. Part I begins by
describing how hard look review creates three kinds of uncertainty about
how courts will treat agency decisions, and how this uncertainty in turn
discourages agencies from adopting legislative rules. It then summarizes
recent proposals to relax the hard look standard and identifies potential
detrimental effects that might flow from these proposals. Part H analyzes
in detail the impact that easing hard look review would have on the three
types of uncertainty that contribute to agencies' propensities to avoid notice
and comment rulemaking. In doing so, however, it considers both the pos-
itive and negative impacts of judicial review on agency policysetting, and
therefore does not assume that avoiding ossification is the only parameter
by which to evaluate these proposals. The Article concludes that calls for
relaxing judicial review may be premature and suggests instead particular
operational changes in the manner in which courts engage in such review
as alternatives that can ease the ossification of rulemaking without for-
feiting the benefits of aggressive judicial review.
I. Hard Look Review and Regulatory Paralysis
The literature on ossification identifies the hard look doctrine of
judicial review as the culprit most responsible for discouraging agency
rulemaking.4' Courts have imposed this doctrine under the rubric of the
traditionally deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review.42
the sense of crisis engendered by this growth); THEODORE J. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE
SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 273-74 (2d ed. 1979) (characterizing Congress's delegation
of lawmaking authority to administrative agencies as contributing to the expansion of government's
coercive powers over citizens); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1295 (1984) (asserting that "'b]ureaucracy [in both the public and private
sectors] is the primary form of organized power in America today, and is therefore a primary target
for those who seek liberation from modern forms of human domination").
40. Elsewhere, I have argued that deliberative democracy is the best justification for granting
agencies policymaking discretion, and noted the relationship of judicial review to this deliberative
function. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv.
L. REV. 1511, 1570 (1992); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REv. 29, 61-62 (1985) (explaining how hard look judicial review attempts to implement the
goals of deliberative democracy).
41. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 2, at 1412; Pierce, supra note 4, at 65.
42. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 7.4, at 311-13 (3d ed. 1994) (detailing how the notice and comment procedures for informal rule-
making have led courts to increase demands for agency reasoning greatly under the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review).
490 [Vol. 75:483
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The doctrine helps to ensure that agency decisions are determined neither
by accommodation of purely private interests" nor by surreptitious com-
mandeering of the decisionmaking apparatus to serve an agency's idiosyn-
cratic view of the public interest.' Instead of merely looking at whether
a regulation is within bounds acceptable under the statutory prescriptions
governing agency discretion, the courts focus on the agency decision-
making process.4' Essentially, under the hard look test, the reviewing
court scrutinizes the agency's reasoning to make certain that the agency
carefully deliberated about the issues raised by its decision.'
The operational demands of the hard look doctrine reflect this focus
on the administrative decisionmaking process. Courts require that agencies
offer detailed explanations for their actions.47 The agency's explanation
must address all factors relevant to the agency's decision. A court may
reverse a decision if the agency fails to consider plausible alternative
measures and explain why it rejected these for the regulatory path it
chose.49 If an agency route veers from the road laid down by its prece-
43. See Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War
Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEG. L.J. 671, 675 (1992) (arguing that rationality review and
rigorous ends-means analysis help prevent agency capture); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy,
Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate
Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 412-13 (noting that substantive judicial review
provides a check against agencies serving purely private interests at the expense of broader public
interests); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation andthe Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 177, 183
(explaining that a dominant theme of hard look review is that "agency decisions should not be merely
responses to private interests equipped with preexisting preferences").
44. Such commandeering might occur because agency staff is not politically accountable and staff
members' control of information that flows to agency heads allows the staff to bias agency rulemaking
toward an outcome that staff members desire. See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg,
White HouseReview ofAgency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1085 (1986); Sidney A. Shapiro,
Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994). To
the extent that hard look review forces agency staff explicitly to address arguments and data submitted
by those outside the agency, it encourages the development of alternative avenues for agency heads to
obtain information about a rule. Because agency heads are somewhat politically responsive, the hard
look test can discourage an internal agency dynamic that contributes to rules that are out of sync with
the public's notion of what is good.
45. See Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal
Conclusions, 48 RuToEGRs L. REv. 313, 316-19 (1996) (describing the difference between outcome-
and process-based judicial review and noting that the arbitrary and capricious standard focuses on the
agency decisionmaking process).
46. See Harold Leventhal, EnvironmentalDecisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 509, 511 (1974).
47. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807
(1973); Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir.),
modified, 713 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
48. See, e.g., Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1994); Maryland People's
Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 780, 785-86 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
49. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 78 (Ist Cir. 1993) (holding that the
EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to explain why it refused to allow a "mixing zone"
analysis in a water pollution control permit); ILGWIU v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 815 (D.C. Cir.
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dents, it must justify the detour in light of changed external circumstances
or a changed view of its regulatory role that the agency can support under
its authorizing statute.' The agency must allow broad participation in its
regulatory process and not disregard the views of any participants.51 In
addition to these procedural requirements, courts have, on occasion,
invoked a rigorous substantive standard by remanding decisions that the
judges believed the agency failed to justify adequately in light of infor-
mation in the administrative record.52
A. Hard Look Review's Propensity to Freeze Agency Regulatory Action
From the agency's perspective, hard look review has become an icy
stare that freezes action; no matter how much care the agency believes it
has given to a decision, the agency faces uncertainty about whether the
reviewing court will find that the agency performed its decisionmaking task
adequately.53 This uncertainty falls into three principal categories.
First, there is uncertainty about whether a court will appreciate "the
problems the agency faces in setting technical standards in complex
areas."5 The agency regulates with a keen eye to "the interrelationships
of issues and the impacts of alternative approaches within the framework
of statutes specifically under [its] charge."55 For a regulatory scheme to
1983) ("[Tlhe Secretary's failure to consider such alternatives and to explain why such alternatives
were not chosen, was arbitrary and capricious. . .).
50. See, e.g., Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. at 808; Citizens Awareness Network v. NRC, 59
F.3d 284, 291 (1st Cir. 1995); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1385 (1 1th
Cir. 1983).
51. See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258, 1284-86 (1st Cir. 1987); Connecticut Light &
Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
52. See, e.g., California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1231-38 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the
rulemaking record did not support the FCC's determination that the benefits of eliminating structural
separations for the Bell Operating Companies justified the harms-that might result from such elimi-
nation); Building& Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1259, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(holding that OSHA's ban on the spraying of asbestos products was not supported by the rulemaking
record), enforced in part sub nom. Building & Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Dole, No. 86-1359,
1989 WL 418934 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 1989); see also Sunstein, supra note 43, at 183 (noting that,
although courts on occasion have remanded agency decisions that the judges found unjustified in light
of the evidentiary record, judges prefer "procedurally" based remands).
53. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 42, § 7.4, at 317 (stating that an agency cannot know the
level of discussion necessary for a court to determine that the requirement of reasoned decisionmaking
has been satisfied); Mashaw, supra note 4, at 203 ("[T]he real impediment created by judicial review
is uncertainty.. . ."); Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEXAS
L. REV. 1243, 1290 (1987) (arguing that the nature of issues an agency must address in rulemaking
and the nature of judicial review place the agency "awash in a sea of uncertainties").
54. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
388 (1986); see also Mashaw, supra note 4, at 203 (noting that the judiciary's lack of technical and
scientific sophistication contributes to uncertainty about whether courts will consider an agency rule to
be reasonable).
55. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1126
(1987).
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succeed, the agency must look beyond the impact of its decision on the
immediate parties to the proceeding. The agency must also deal, on a day-
to-day basis, with the issues left open by its decision. It must consider
how it will enforce its standards and what problems implementation of the
standards will cause. A reviewing court need not concern itself with any
of these matters; 6 instead, the court brings to the reviewing process
perceptions of legally educated, but not technically educated, judges.57
Hence the reviewing court often emphasizes fairness to the parties in the
particular proceeding and is apt to find pragmatic compromises made by
agencies to be "irrational." 58 In short, the reviewing judge is an outsider
to the agency process; her perspective frequently diminishes technical or
practical constraints that the agency faces. By applying her sense of law
and logic to an agency decision, the judge instead views the decision-
making process from a legal vantage point that accentuates concerns that
the agency not abuse the coercive power it wields by virtue of its authori-
zing statute.
In order to identify and understand the concerns of judges better, and
to convince courts of the merits of their decisions, many agencies have
included, in their internal rulemaking mechanisms, professionals from
disciplines outside those that traditionally have dominated each particular
agency. 9 The EPA has economists, engineers, chemists, and health sci-
56. See id. at 1126-27 (arguing that judges should defer to agency interpretations of indeterminate
statutory language in order to promote the coherency of the agency's programs); see also Pierce, supra
note 13, at 315 (summarizing Strauss). Shep Melnick has pointed out numerous instances in which the
courts' role as occasional intermeddlers in the Clean Air Act's regulatory scheme resulted in the EPA's
adoption of stringent standards that were impossible for the agency to enforce or for targeted entities
to meet. MELNICK, supra note 25, at 190-91, 295. Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst reported a some-
what opposite direct effect ofjudicial review on NHTSA's regulatory program under the Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966. Mashaw and Harfst contend that judges' lack of understanding regarding the mea-
surement of the crashworthiness of automobiles, along with their propensity to cast issues in terms of
fairness, led a reviewing court to remand NHTSA's crashworthiness safety rules because of uncertainty
about the agency's specification of crash test dummies. Despite the opposite influence of judicial re-
view in the auto safety context, the ultimate result was the same: NHTSA adopted a regulatory strategy
that satisfied the reviewing courts but resulted in no meaningful increase in safety. MASHAW &
HAIRusT, supra note 1, at 89-91.
57. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 1126 (noting that the courts' lack of responsibility for the
success of a statutory scheme causes them to focus on fundamental individual rights rather than the
functioning of the regulatory system).
58. Breyer, supra note 54, at 389.
59. FERC's need for biologists and environmental scientists, for example, traces back to Udall
v. Federal Power Commission, 387 U.S. 428 (1967). The Udall Court demanded that the Federal
Power Commission (FPC) exploreissues including the preservation of wild rivers and wilderness areas,
the preservation of anadromous fish, and the protection of wildlife, before authorizing a dam on the
Snake River. Id. at 450. This demand presaged the need for the Commission to study biological and
ecological factors even before NEPA required consideration of the environmental impacts of federal
projects. In fact, NEPA's demands for an ETS, and the statute's general expectation that agencies will
take a broader perspective than they had traditionally, arose out of environmental cases in which courts
developed what later became known as hard look review. See Rabin, supra note 3, at 1298-99; see
Texas Law Review [Vol. 75:483
entists who analyze the various technical issues presented by a proposed
regulation.' Even the structure of the independent commissions, whose
primary responsibility remains the pricing and allocation of utility services,
has changed to include health and environmental scientists who help per-
form environmental reviews." For issues involving scientific method-
ology, some agencies voluntarily submit proposed regulations to panels of
outside experts with whom the agencies have contracted.62 These added
internal checks provide assurance that the agency has not missed something
that the court will find crucial to the decision. Unfortunately, they greatly
delay the issuance of regulations.' The checks also tend to "water
down" those regulations that the agency does adopt, because only regula-
tions acceptable to a broad array of experts with varying perspectives
receive approval from all the panels and offices that internally review
them."
The history of the State Implementation Plan (SIP) process for imple-
menting National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) under the
Clean Air Act' illustrates how skeptical courts can interfere with the
also THOMAS 0. McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN
THE FEDERALBUREAUCRACY204-05 (1991) [hereinafter RATIONALITY] (describing the roles of various
professionals on the FAA staff in the regulatory analyses required to support rules); Thomas 0.
McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at
57, 58 [hereinafter Internal Structure] (noting that the "exigencies of external review" have greatly
contributed to the structure of the EPA's rulemaking process).
60. See McGarity, Internal Structure, supra note 59, at 60-61.
61. See CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 588-95 (3d ed. 1993) (asserting that Public Utility Commissions now must address
environmental issues in their decisionmaking); see also FRANCIS E. ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY,
POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 121, 120-25 (2d ed. 1976) (noting the "expanding role of outsiders in
the internal deliberations of executive agencies").
62. See McGarity, Internal Structure, supra note 59, at 88 (noting the EPA's use of outside
scientists to review rules prior to their promulgation); Richard A. Merrill, Federal Regulation of
Cancer-Causing Chemicals, 2 ADMIN. CONF. U.S.: RECOMMENDATIONS & REP. 21, 127-28 (1982)
(explaining how agency use of a panel of outside scientists can enhance technical decisionmaking);
Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69
CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1354-57 (1981) (discussing the FDA's use of technical advisory committees).
63. See ALFRED A. MARCUS, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE: CHOOSING AND IMPLEMENTING AN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 111 (1980) (noting that researchers hired by the EPA complained that the
deadlines in the 1970 Clean Water Act and the 1972 Water Pollution Control Act were unrealistic);
McGarity, Internal Structure, supra note 59, at 91, 101 (discussing the propensity of the "team model"
and "adversarial model" to create delay in adopting rules); see also Merrill, supra note 62, at 134
(noting that agencies incur delays even in forming an advisory committee to review their regulations).
64. See GEORGE C. EDWARDS I & IRA SHARKANSKY, THE POLICY PREDICAMENT: MAKING AND
IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY 128 (1978) (underscoring that "efforts to produce an appearance of
unanimity can reduce experts' recommendations to broad generalizations" and disguise potential
problems); see also MASHAW & HARFST, supra ntote 1, at 75-77 (demonstrating how the need for scien-
tific and industry acceptance watered down NHTSA's initial auto safety standards); McGarity, Internal
Structure, supra note 59, at 92 (arguing that the "team approach" to scientific decisionmaking may
"steer the group away from the best solutions").
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994). The Clean Air Act mandates that the EPA establish
NAAQS required to protect public health and welfare. Id. § 7409(b)(1) (stipulating that the primary
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operation of a regulatory program. The NAAQS program requires the
EPA to set air quality standards without regard for the cost of meeting
those standards.' The Act calls upon states to adopt implementation
plans, which are to specify enforceable standards that ensure that the
NAAQS will be met by statutorily imposed deadlines.67 In formulating
a plan, a state can consider the feasibility and costs of achieving emission
standards for particular pollution sources only to the extent that such
consideration will not result in a violation of the NAAQS 8 In addition,
permits for new sources in "dirty air" areas are to impose emissions limi-
tations that force the use of the best emission reduction technology either
in use or deemed feasible by any SIP 9 The EPA is responsible for en-
suring that state permits and standards will achieve the NAAQS within
statutorily specified deadlines.7'
In reviewing an EPA approval of a SIP, the Supreme Court affirmed
the agency view that costs and feasibility were to be secondary to meeting
clean air standards.71 It is the more locally oriented federal district
courts, however, that review EPA decisions enforcing state plans, and these
courts are more solicitous of industry concerns about the impact of SIP
compliance costs.' In response to complaints that the EPA was de-
manding compliance with standards that sources could not meet, these
courts often deferred to state court determinations that the SIP provisions
NAAQS must be set to protect public health); id. § 7409(b)(2) (stipulating that secondary NAAQ$
shall be set to protect public welfare). The Act requires each state to adopt a State Implementation Plan
that provides enforceable standards necessary or appropriate to meet the NAAQS. Id. § 7410(a).
66. See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated in part by 921 F.2d
326 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1980); George
Eads, The Confusion of Goals and Instruments: The Explicit Consideration of Costs in Setting National
Ambient Air Quality Standards, in To BREATHE FREELY: RISK, CONSENT, AND AIR 222, 222 (Mary
Gibson ed., 1985); see also MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 65 (1990) (implying that, despite the Clean Air Act's sole focus on
health effects, the EPA could not set a NAAQS without implicitly taking costs into account).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1994).
68. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 264, 264-65 (1976) (holding that, in setting air
quality standards, a state may choose to force technology and risk losing an industry if attainment is
not possible, but may not choose to set a standard below the "minimum conditions" of the Clean Air
Act).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2) (1994) (requiring new sources in nonattainment areas to comply
with the lowest achievable emissions rate (LAER)); id. § 7501(3) (defining LAER). LAER is the
strictest requirement imposed on stationary sources by the Clean Air Act, and is viewed as a means of
encouraging use of new pollution-reduction technology without imposing an impossible burden on air
pollution sources. See FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND
POLICY 268 (2d ed. 1990); 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER
§3.12(2).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k) (1994).
71. The Court, however, stated that the Clean Air Act did not prevent sources from challenging
a SIP in state courts on grounds that the SIP imposed infeasible emissions standards. Union Electric,
427 U.S. at 266.
72. See MELNICK, supra note 25, at 236-37.
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were infeasible.' Some even used their equitable powers of relief in
enforcement actions to read into the provisions governing permit-based
emission standards the requirement that such standards be feasible.'
Moreover, because district court judges did not share the EPAs profes-
sional optimism about the progress of technology, their concern for their
communities and their sense of fairness disinclined them to hold local
businesses to standards that might prove impossible to meet.75
The reticence of district courts to enforce EPA emissions standards,
and the willingness of these courts to respond to the pleadings of industry
and states, leave the agency with a Hobson's choice: Either compromise
with the states and industry and try to reduce pollution as best it can with
industry cooperation, or spend scarce resources to fund demonstration
projects and hire engineers and scientists to prove convincingly the feasi-
bility of the emissions standards it seeks to enforce.76 The first choice
gives the states and even the regulated entities something akin to a veto of
the EPA's technology-forcing emissions standards. The second choice in-
creases the delay and expense of setting such standards. In addition, by
imposing on the EPA the burden of having to prove the feasibility of stan-
dards, the district courts undercut the EPA's ability to impose aggressive
technology-forcing measures even when the EPA does not settle with the
polluter. Either choice by the EPA has contributed to delays that have
come to plague the air quality program of the Clean Air Act.
The second aspect of uncertainty introduced by hard look review con-
cerns the significance of particular issues raised by an agency's regulatory
action.7 The hard look doctrine purports to require agencies to consider
73. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Indiana-Kentucky Elec. Corp., 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1511,
1512 (S.D. Ind. 1981) (refusing to enforce a SIP requirement that the state courts had held invalid
because the state agency had failed to consider the technological feasibility of the requirement (referring
to Indiana Envtl. Management Bd. v. Indiana-Kentucky Elec. Corp., 393 N.E.2d 213, 222 (Ind.
1979))); Kennecott Copper Corp., Nev. Mines Div. v. Train, 424 F. Supp. 1217, 1230-31 (D. Nev.
1976) (upholding a state court's grant of an injunction on grounds of economic infeasibility), rev'd on
other grounds, 572 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting in dicta that even if the lower court had properly
exercised jurisdiction, intervention by the district court was still improper because the Administrator
could not be bound by a state's finding of economic infeasibility).
74. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 450 F. Supp. 805, 815 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (holding that a court
may use its equitable powers to prevent irreparable harm when a party in good faith seeks a variance
from a SIP), rev'd, 593 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1979); see also, e.g., United States v. Interlake, Inc., 429
F. Supp. 193, 197 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (observing that the feasibility of SIP requirements can be raised
as a defense to an EPA enforcement proceeding, but abstaining from deciding whether the SIP is
unconstitutionally vague until the state interprets the SIP); Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Elec. Power
Co., 419 F. Supp. 528, 535 (D.D.C. 1976) (stating in dicta that although infeasibility is not a defense
to an EPA proceeding to enforce a SIP requirement, courts have equitable powers to refrain from
ordering a violating source to shut down).
75. For a general description of the barriers courts erected to EPA enforcement of SIP
requirements, see MELNICK, supra note 25, at 193-238.
76. See id. at 195 (noting how courts' reticence to impose sanctions for SIP violations results in
greater expenditures of EPA resources and encourages the EPA to make concessions to polluters).
77. See Mashaw, supra note 4, at 203 (noting the uncertainty that results because judges are
relatively uninformed about which of the issues raised in a challenge to a rule are important); Pierce,
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all relevant factors.78 But an enormous number of factors inevitably have
some relevance to the agency decision," though not necessarily enough
to warrant the time and effort called for by the hard look test. The
question for the agency seeking to promulgate a rule is: Which factors or
issues will the reviewing court consider sufficiently important to have
merited rigorous analysis by the agency?
This question arises in virtually every case of agency rulemaking.
Every agency rule in a complex regulatory scheme will have ancillary im-
pacts and raise issues other than the primary controversies that the agency
decision resolves. Nonetheless, such issues may be significant enough that
the wisdom of the agency action hinges on their resolution. It is very
difficult for a reviewing court to appreciate the significance of ancillary
issues that an agency decision may raise. A court is often left with a
choice between deferring totally to the agency's characterization of an issue
as tangential and insisting that the agency take the utmost care in resolving
every aspect of every problem raised by a proposed rule. Demanding the
utmost care on ancillary issues can have the perverse effect of precluding
agency regulation altogether."
For example, early on in its regulatory agenda, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration decided to require crashworthy cars, and its
first step in this program was adoption of its passive restraint standard."1
This standard, expressed as a performance standard,' represented a major
break with regulations of the past, which had imposed modest design re-
quirements on individual components of automobiles.' The crashwor-
thiness program, in contrast, threatened to create uncertainty about manu-
facturers' ability to meet NHTSA standards and to impose major costs on
the auto industry' Despite these threats, and in the face of aggressive
supra note 4, at 74 (asserting that an "agency cannot predict which ... issues a court will consider
so important as to justify detailed treatment").
78. See Breyer, supra note 54, at 383; see also, e.g., Benov. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057,1073-74 (9th
Cir. 1994); Central fll. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 941 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1991); Iowa Terminal
Ry. v. ICC, 853 F.2d 965, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Maryland People's Counselv. FERC, 761 F.2d 780,
785-86 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
79. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 69 ("[A]ny competent lawyer with access to sufficient resources
can identify issues that an agency arguably discussed inadequately.").
80. See Mashaw, supra note 4, at 203 (arguing that uncertainty about the significance courts will
attach to issues "produces defensive rulemaking, if not abandonment of the rulemaking process").
81. For a comprehensive history of NHTSA's attempt to adopt a crashworthiness auto safety
program, and the impact of judicial review on this program, see MASHAW & HAR.FST, supra note 1,
at 87-105.
82. The standard provided that "anthropomorphic test devices" (i.e., crash test dummies) with
specified measuring devices had to register lower than certain allowable levels of force and deceler-
ation. Occupant Crash Protection, 35 Fed. Reg. 16927, 16929 (1970).
83. See MASHAW & HARSr, supra note 1, at 74-83.
84. See id. at 86 (describing the controversies over feasibility and costs of Standard 208, the
agency's first standard pursuant to its crashworthiness program).
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challenges on judicial review, NHTSA was able to support its overall judg-
ment that its passive restraint standard was a reasonable response to the
statutory mandate to improve auto safety.'
Nevertheless, the regulatory program adopted by NHTSA depended
on testing crashworthiness using crash test dummies, and the agency had
not specified the requirements for such dummies in sufficiently "objective"
terms to guarantee that tests under identical conditions would yield identical
results. 6 By most accounts, the objectivityof the specifications for crash
dummies was not a major bone of contention in the agency proceeding.'
The reviewing court, however, thought the issue of dummy specification
to be sufficiently significant that it reversed and remanded the regulations
until the agency issued specifications for dummies that would satisfy the
court's requirement of identical results.88 By the time the agency issued
specifications that addressed the objections of the industry, the political
window that had allowed NHTSA to adopt the entire regulatory scheme
had closed.89 Thus, the ancillary issue of the design of crash test dum-
mies essentially precluded NHTSA from adopting crashworthiness rules for
auto safety that virtually all agreed would have provided significant net
social benefits.
The third sort of uncertainty engendered by hard look review involves
the question of how much analysis is enough. Even when the agency has
explained its resolution of an issue, courts sometimes remain unsatisfied
that the agency has performed an adequate analysis.'o To meet the hard
look test an agency must persuade the court that it gave reasoned consider-
ation to the administrative record, yet the test provides no objective
formula for an agency to evaluate whether it has given sufficient care to an
issue.91
To the extent the hard look doctrine has imparted any message to
agencies, it is that agencies must collect data and provide analyses to
85. See Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 674-75 (6th Cir. 1972).
86. Id. at 676.
87. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 1, at 90 (noting that airbag suppliers and some auto-
mobile manufacturers found the standard sufficiently objective to state that they would be able to
comply with it).
88. Chrysler, 472 F.2d at 681.
89. See MASHAW & HARFSr, supra note 1, at 92 (explaining that "Chrysler lent political support
to the manufacturer's basic criticism of NHTSA's new performance-based approach"); id. at 123
(detailing the change in the "overall political climate" surrounding auto safety regulation).
90. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 69 ("Agencies can predict neither the scope nor the intensity of
the duty [to explain rulemaking decisions] as it is ultimately applied by a reviewing court.").
91. Compare, e.g., Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1332 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing
to second-guess the agency's crediting of experts' opinion about technical facts), with Foundation for
N. Am. Wild Sheep v. Department of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the
agency's conclusions about the reaction of wild sheep to a road because the data on which the agency




support their rejection of every reasonable alternative to the approach they
took and to respond to every plausible argument against their approach.
Agencies have reacted in part by performing costly and time-consuming
studies to support their rules to the neglect of other parts of their statutory
mandates.' They have also reacted in part by shying away from issuing
regulations for which the evidentiary support would be too expensive or
time consuming for the agency to obtain.' 3 Either response chills the
setting of regulatory standards.
Moreover, when a court reverses and remands a decision to an agency
on the grounds that the decision is not sufficiently supported by data and
reasoning, the court often imposes an impossible task on the agency. For
example, in the celebrated State Farm decision,' the Supreme Court re-
jected NHTSA's determination that auto owners would disable automatic
seatbelts.95 At the outset, the Court accepted NHTSA's conclusion that
data from automobiles with automatic belts were not a reliable predictor of
usage of such belts because owners of these cars had voluntary purchased
the automatic seatbelt option and the cars were equipped with a device
inhibiting detachment.' The Court, however, found problems with the
agency's reliance on data about seatbelt use in automobiles equipped with
manual belts because NHTSA had failed adequately to take into account
that the same inertia that might discourage an automobile occupant from
buckling a manual belt would also discourage the occupant from disabling
an automatic belt.' This left NHTSA in the unenviable position of hav-
ing data with only marginal relevance to the critical issue of predicted
usage of automatic seatbelts. By remanding the agency's factual judgment
concerning this data, the Court implicitly imposed on NHTSA the task of
collecting additional data from a representative population of automobiles
that did not exist. Not surprisingly, NHTSA chose to wait for Congress
to provide a political solution to this regulatory quandary.
B. The Call for Turning Hard Looks into Soft Glances
The uncertainties and demands for prohibitively expensive analyses
engendered by the hard look test have prompted numerous calls for an
92. See, e.g., MELNICK, supra note 25, at 347 (concluding that the court-initiated prevention of
a significant deterioration program under the Clean Air Act diverted scarce administrative resources
from other programs).
93. See, e.g., MAStAW & HARFST, supra note 1, at 121-22 (reporting a colloquy between Senator
Hartke and NHTSA's chief counsel, during which the chief counsel indicated that judicial review was
preventing NHTSA from promulgating certain regulations); McGarity, supra note 2, at 1414-19
(reporting that overly aggressive judicial review contributed to the abandonment of rulemakings by the
EPA and the Consumer Products Safety Commission).
94. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
95. Id. at 46.
96. Id. at 52-53.
97. Id. at 54.
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easing of judicial oversight of agency decisionmaking. 98 For the most
part, commentators have advocated a change in the hard look metaphor,
suggesting instead that courts act as judicial "nursemaids" to agency
decisionmaking or, alternatively, as professors evaluating the agency on
whether its decision merited a passing grade." I am skeptical, however,
whether a more deferential attitude toward agency decisionmaking will
relieve the problems created by hard look review without forfeiting the
benefits that flow from such review.100
First, calls for a new metaphor, such as "pass/fail" review, do not
take into account judges' motivations in establishing administrative law
doctrine. According to a leading model, judges tend to balance their
ability to dictate outcomes consistent with their own values against the
impact that deviating from existing doctrine will have on their judicial
reputations and pride in their judicial abilities.0 1  Increasing the
indeterminacy of administrative law doctrine allows judges to pursue their
preferred outcomes without paying a reputational price." If that is so,
then the replacement of one fuzzy metaphor with another that sounds more
deferential is unlikely to have any significant impact on the outcome of
challenges to particular rules."t3 In the end, calls for pass/fail review,
without any operational guidelines constraining how courts should decide
what passes and what fails are unlikely to alter the actual operation of
judicial review.
Second, raising the level of deference to agency rulemaking may not
reduce an agency's incentives to engage in excessive data collection and
analysis. Simply making review more "agency friendly" will not tell the
agency how to perform its analyses in a manner sufficient to pass judicial
review. Moreover, without delving into the details of a rulemaking record
and questioning the agency's rationale in light of data and arguments sub-
mitted by challengers of the rule, most judges lack the expertise with the
98. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 4; McGarity, supra note 4; Pierce, supra note 4.
99. See McGarity, supra note 2, at 1453 (suggesting the pass/fail metaphor); Patricia M. Weld,
Making "Informed"Decisions on the District of Columbia Circuit, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 135, 138
(1982) (suggesting the nursemaid metaphor).
100. Cf. Mark V. Tushnet, JudicialReview, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 77, 77 (1984) (asserting
that there is an inescapable tension between allowing meaningfuljudicial review and limiting the discre-
tion of judges to invalidate political decisions of the legislature and the executive).
101. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUK L.J. 1051, 1055-57 (1995). Although
Shapiro and Levy's model of judicial motivation is not without controversy, it is the only model of
which I am aware that analyzes the motivations ofjudges in reviewing agency decisions, and captures
at least some of the influences on judges in that context.
102. See id. at 1058-62.
103. Cf. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Review ofAgency Action: The Problems of Commitment,
Non-Contractibility, and the Proper Incentives, 44 DUKE L.J. 1133, 1150 (1995) (arguing that,
accepting Shapiro and Levy's theory of judicial motivation, their proposed reform of the APA is
unlikely to alter judicial review because their proposed standards are little more determinate than
existing doctrine).
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substantive areas of agency regulation to know whether the agency, in
adopting the rule, has reached a reasonable decision. Hence, even under
a more deferential standard of review, courts will have to consult the
record and ensure that it is consistent with the agency's reasoning. 104
This in turn sends a message to the agency that its chances of success on
review increase if it collects additional data and performs more analysis.
Thus, significant incentives remain for an agency to overtax its scarce
regulatory resources.
Third, easing of judicial review may have a detrimental impact on the
agency deliberative process. 105 For example, courts could dramatically
reduce the uncertainty created by judicial review simply by eliminating
meaningful review; they could affirm any rule that was not wholly irra-
tional."0 That would still leave congressional and presidential review to
ensure against unwise agency rulemaking.Y° But both congressional and
104. Cf. Leventhal, supra note 46, at 528 (contending that, in order to determine whether an
agency has given good faith consideration to environmental impacts under NEPA, a court must engage
in "an analysis of the environmental consequences sufficient to convince [the] court that these impacts
have been considered").
105. The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) rulemaking on funding of family
planning projects that support abortion, ultimately upheld in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991),
illustrates how easing the requirement that agencies support their rules with detailed reasons can have
perverse effects on agency policymaking. See HHS Regulations Regarding Statutory Prohibition on
Use of Appropriated Funds in Programs Where Abortion is a Method of Family Planning, 53 Fed.
Reg. 2922 (1988). Because the second step of the Chevron doctrine requires courts to defer to an
agency's interpretation of a statute if that interpretation is reasonable, HHS never bothered to analyze
the policy implications of its interpretation challenged in Rust. Instead, the agency took advantage of
the leeway granted by Chevron to reduce its role (as opposed to that of the reviewing court) to one of
determining whether a politically driven interpretation was permissible. See Mark Seidenfeld, A
Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaldng in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of
Statutes, 73 TExAs L. REv. 83, 109-11 (1994) (describing Chevron's influence on HHS's view of its
regulatory task); see also Zeppos, supra note 103, at 1147-49 (noting that the Department of Justice's
focus on Chevron's step one in litigating administrative matters for agencies may have had perverse
effects on the ability of agency staff to dictate regulatory policy).
106. If courts deferred to all but irrational agency decisions, that would reduce uncertainty about
the level of analysis agencies would have to perform by informing them that they need perform no
analysis. Although this might encourage rulemaking, it is also almost certain to encourage lack of care
by the agency in adopting a rule as well. See Breyer, supra note 54, at 395 (noting that the overall
impact ofjudicial review might be to encourage more reasonable agency decisions). Courts could also
alleviate uncertainty about the required level of agency analysis by going to the opposite extreme and
simply reversing any rule if the record left any doubt about its wisdom. Cf. Zeppos, supra note 103,
at 1143 ("[I1t is possible to have what appear[s] to be more determinate. . . judicial review but have
power taken away from administrative agencies."). Such an approach would encourage deliberation
when the agency decided to adopt a rule, but would impose such an extreme requirement of collection
and analysis of information that the costs of deliberation would almost certainly exceed the benefits.
Under such a strict approach to review, agencies would adopt standards by any means other than rule-
making whenever they could. Not surprisingly, no commentator has suggested increasing the strin-
gency of judicial review as a means of decreasing uncertainty.
107. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of
Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1248-51 (1989).
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presidential review increase the propensity for agency rules to benefit
groups with narrow interests." 8 By demanding that agencies publicly
justify their rules, however, judicial review can discourage the adoption
and interpretation of rules preferred by special interest groups."
Increasing the likelihood that a rule will be upheld by relaxing the re-
quirements that an agency explain its decision to a court might, by the
same token, increase the proportion of rules driven by pressure from
special interest groups or an agency agenda that is at odds with the general
public's desire for regulation.
To the extent that a more deferential sounding metaphor will raise
affirmance rates for agency rules, one would expect agencies to increase
their willingness to resort to rulemaking to set policy. For some who
bemoan the flight from rulemaking, this alone justifies easing the overall
standard of judicial review.110 But, increased use of rulemaking is not
always appropriate;1 sometimes judicial rejections of rules reflect
circumstances that make incremental, case-by-case policymaking a prefer-
able alternative to rulemaking.1 Moreover, benefits from encouraging
rulemaking must be offset by any detrimental impact easing review will
have on the quality of agency decisionmaking and judicial filtering of bad
rules from good ones. Hence, before accepting or rejecting proposals to
ease the strictness of arbitrary and capricious review, one should carefully
analyze how proposed modifications of the hard look test will affect both
108. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-
Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10-12, 21 (1994); see also Breyer, supra note 54, at 395 ("One can still
argue in favor of [judicial review] by claiming that the President's efforts will be affected greatly by
the politics of the day and that Congressional efforts may be incoherent." (footnote omitted)).
109. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223,256 (1986) (arguing, in the context
of agency interpretation of statutes, that courts' focus on public justifications for statutory provisions
tends to increase the likelihood of public-interest-oriented interpretations of statutes); Seidenfeld, supra
note 105, at 136 & n.261 (remarking that a requirement that agencies publicly provide detailed reasons
for their decisions, as required by hard look review, reduces the costs of monitoring against special-
interest-oriented agency decisions).
110. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 1, at 27.
111. See Glen 0. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking
and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 535 (1970)
(analyzing the history of two uses of rulemaking in FCC and CAB proceedings and concluding that
"rulemaking procedures are inherently no more productive of effective policy-making than are
adjudicatory proceedings"); see also Daniel J. Gifford, Discretionary Decisionmaking in the Regulatory
Agencies:A Conceptual Framework, 57S. CAL. L. REv. 101, 129-31 (1983) (explaining how agencies
can use adjudication to avoid constraining their future actions while they gain information from
experience with particular cases).
112. For example, with respect to the very issue for which Richard Pierce found judicial review
had discouraged needed rulemaking, another commentator argued that FERC's resort to adjudication
in concrete cases to set the parameters for deregulating wholesale electric power may have allowed the
agency to "decide which policies are [best] suited to current technological, regulatory and market
conditions." Rossi, supra note 1, at 805.
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the quality of agency decisionmaking as well as the agency's willingness
to resort to rulemaking to set regulatory standards of conduct.
II. The Impact of Easing Hard Look Review on Agency Uncertainty
To evaluate the overall benefit of easing hard look review, one must
balance the effects such an easing will have on the quality of agency
decisionmaking against the benefits of increasing the flexibility of the
regulatory process.113 Crucial to such an evaluation is consideration of
how courts might structure more deferential review to avoid the three types
of uncertainty that the hard look test introduces into the rulemaking
process."' 4 Having courts implement operational changes in the way
they engage in hard look review, instead of altering the overall level of
deference they accord agency decisions, may be more likely to affect judi-
cial review in a manner that will deossify the rulemaking process.
Operational changes can be structured to specify with particularity how
courts should sift through a rulemaking record to minimize uncertainty
without forfeiting the benefits of hard look review. Moreover, the specifi-
city of operational criteria would increase the reputational cost to judges
who ignored them, thereby increasing the likelihood that courts, in indi-
vidual cases, would conform to these changes rather than pursue a partic-
ular outcome.1 5 Thus, in analyzing the likely impacts of altering stan-
113. See Strauss, supra note 29, at 1473, 1473-74 (arguing that easingjudicial review to facilitate
rulemaking might compromise the "important good" of controlling government discretion).
114. For a description of these three types of uncertainty, see supra notes 54, 77, and 90, and
accompanying text.
115. I have assumed the courts themselves would adopt any operational changes in judicial review,
rather than the legislature imposing those changes on the courts. First, I do not believe that the current
Congress is likely to adopt these changes as amendments to the APA. C. Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Legisladve Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1127-28 (1995)
(expressing skepticism about the suggested legislative reforms proposed by Shapiro and Levy, supra
note 101, at 1073-75). Second, I am somewhat optimistic that individual judges will recognize that
they are in a repeated prisoner's dilemma situation: All would be best off if they would not pursue
outcomes in particular cases, but each needs a mechanism to monitor and enforce that her brethren will
not pursue outcomes. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 33-35, 165-67
(1994) (describing the prisoner's dilemma and repeated games); cf. Zeppos, supra note 103, at 1138
(describing the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron as motivated by the desire to gain benefits from
cooperating in such a repeated game). The specificity of my suggested operational changes facilitates
such monitoring, allowing enforcement by a threat of a tit-for-tat or trigger strategy. See BAIRD ET
AL., supra at 167-72 (noting that for a repeated prisoner's dilemma in which the number of repetitions
is unknown, cooperative strategies backed by threats of retaliation for deviations by the other players
can form stable equilibria); cf. Zeppos, supra note 103, at 1140-41 (noting that the problem the
Supreme Court has had in enforcing the Chevron game stems from the Justices' inability to agree
whether any one of them has breached the agreement to apply the Chevron doctrine). Finally, even if
lower-court judges do not press for such doctrinal changes themselves, the Supreme Court has a great
incentive to do so because the number of cases the Justices hear is so limited that they derive little
benefit, compared to judges on the lower courts, from the occasional ability to alter outcomes in
particular cases. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 1101-02 (noting that the Supreme Court's limited
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dards of judicial review, one must consider particular changes in how
courts go about performing such review as alternatives to merely changing
the overall deference of review.11
A. Uncertainty About How Reviewing Courts Will Treat Agency Expertise
To alter the level of deference of judicial review as a means of easing
uncertainty about the significance judges might attach to agency expertise
in a particular context, courts would have to refrain from questioning the
assumptions underlying technical assessments when an agency invokes its
expertise to justify those assumptions. Such assumptions, however, often
make or break the agency's explanation for the standard it imposes. 17
Often there are no data that prove the effectiveness or feasibility of a
standard directly. Instead, the agency is faced with data in related
situations that may support or undermine its standard, and the agency must
assess the extent to which such data relate to the situation covered by the
standard."' Faced with such a situation, applying a deferential pass/fail
standard of review precludes the court from delving into agency decisions
that the agency asserts flow from its experience in dealing with such
matters.
How such added deference might ease rulemaking burdens can be il-
lustrated by returning to the example of EPA decisions regarding emission
ability to review administrative law cases encourages it to send clear signals to the lower courts about
how to apply standards on review rather than to correct their particular misapplications of law).
116. I am not the first to venture down the path of suggesting a solution that focuses on particular
operational criteria for channelling judicial review. Recently, Richard Pierce began to forge this trail
with his article evaluating judicial modifications to traditional doctrines of judicial review as means of
deossifying rulemaking. Pierce, supra note 4, at 71-93. In addition, Sidney Shapiro and Robert Levy
have proposed a detailed statutory amendment to the review provisions of the APA that they believe
reduces the indeterminacy of the existing standard of review. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 101, at
1074, 1077. But see Ronald M. Levin, Comment, Judicial Review and the Uncertain Appeal of
Certainty on Appeal, 44 DuKE L.J. 1081, 1087 (1995) (questioning whether Shapiro and Levy's sug-
gested standards for review are not merely calls for increased judicial deference to agency decisions).
117. The EPA's setting of the allowed ambient air concentration for lead, under the Clean Air
Act's NAAQS program, is a classic example of a regulation that crucially depended on the agency's
expert judgement about the significance of existing data. The statute required the Administrator to set
the standard at the level necessary to protect the public health, allowing for an adequate margin of
safety. The Administrator relied on studies showing that blood levels of 40 pg/dl, the level that the
Center for Disease Control (CDC) considered the'threshold of undue exposure as evidenced by
increased levels of EPP, would providethe adequatemargin of safety required by the statute. The EPA
had no data that clearly distinguished the 30 tig/dl level from any other level, but simply used its expert
judgment, informed perhaps by that of the CDC, to choose this level. National Primary and Secondary
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 46246, 46252-53 (1978).
118. Again the setting of the NAAQS for lead provides an apt example. The EPA methodology
for setting the NAAQS required the agency to determine how lead in the air contributes to levels of
lead in the blood. The EPA had data showing that every 1 1g/rnd of lead in the air tended to increase
lead by 1.5 jug/dl in the blood of adults. Some studies indicated, however, that children are more
sensitive than adults to exposure to lead. The EPA thus translated this data into a finding that every
I lg/m3 of lead in the air tended to increase lead by 2.0 Ag/dl in the blood of children. Id. at 46250.
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standards in permits for new sources in "nonattainment" areas for a criteria
pollutant.119 Suppose the EPA had based a standard on a breakthrough
in the basic chemistry involving a pollutant. Theory and laboratory tests
suggest that this breakthrough will enable industry to improve its tech-
niques for removing the pollutant from the exhaust of manufacturing
plants. The EPA "experts," schooled in these disciplines, find the opti-
mistic outlook of the pure scientists compelling. The lay courts, however,
perhaps remembering other salient instances in which technology did not
fulfill its promise, might not find the data as conclusive.
Under the hard look test, in the face of strong denials of effectiveness
or feasibility by the industry, a court might demand that the EPA point to
prototypes of the new technique, have engineers perform studies showing
that such prototypes can work in the context and on the scale at which the
standard will apply, and have economists conduct studies of the costs of the
technique and the impact of such costs on the industry or even particular
sources."2 To ease these administrative burdens, a pass/fail test would
have to mandate that the reviewing court accept the EPA's assertion that
the technology can be developed within a time frame that will allow the
source to meet the emission standard. The EPA presumably would meet
the pass/fail test as long as its explanation for its standard explicitly
addresses this prediction. Thus, the test would obviate the need for the
EPA to delay the rulemaking while it performed studies or commissioned
prototypes in order to pass judicial review.
It is highly questionable, however, that relaxing the standard of judi-
cial review at this point in time will greatly reduce agencies' propensity to
seek reinforcement from diverse professional perspectives for the technical
assumptions it makes in reaching a decision. Even if the law relaxed its
requirements, the politics of regulation has become accustomed to environ-
119. Criteria pollutants are those for which the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set NAAQS.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1) (1994). Nonattainment areas are those regions of the country for which
the ambient concentrations of the pollutant in the air exceed the NAAQS set by the EPA. See id. §
7407(d)(l)(A)(i).
120. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1293-99 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(rejecting OSHA's findings that permissible exposure levels for lead were technologically feasible in
part because the agency had not developed data quantifying the extent to which the promising
technological innovations it identified would reduce workers' exposure to lead); National Lime Ass'n
v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (remanding a new source performance standard for
cement plants because the EPA had not demonstrated that the plants at which the EPA had tested the
technology were representative of those used by the industry); International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 641-47 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (rejecting the EPA Administrator's prediction
that the auto industry could comply with technology-forcing emissions limitations because the agency
had not collected data over the useful lives of vehicles and questioning the agency's assumptions about
the reliability of predictions made from data over shorter periods of use); cf Appalachian Power Co.
v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1366 (4th Cir. 1976) (cautioning the agency that it had not adequately consid-
ered industry arguments that backfitting power plants with controls on thermal water pollution was not
economically feasible).
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mental impact statements and regulatory impact analyses. The affected
public has come to expect agencies to double-check their assumptions with
others who have a less direct stake in adopting given regulations,"' and
the politically responsive branches of government in the White House and
the Capitol probably would not tolerate off-the-cuff agency decision-
making." If anything, recent legislative proposals regarding administra-
tive regulations hint that the political process will demand more agency
analyses and outside checks before an agency adopts a rule."z
There is, moreover, a fundamental reason for encouraging an agency
to seek diverse professional perspectives from within its staff when
developing rules. Staff members play a crucial role by filtering infor-
mation and analyses that get to the agency head-the commission or secre-
tary ultimately responsible for adopting the rule." Based on this
information, the decisionmaker may well conclude that alternatives to the
staff's proposed rule are untenable. To the extent that the channelled
information reflects an idiosyncratic regulatory perspective of a subgroup
of the agency staff, it can lead the agency head to adopt a rule that
advances a parochial vision of the public interest or that is downright
unwise.' z'
121. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROS., Autumn 1991, at 311, 335-36 (describing how distrust
of the EPA led the courts to impose burdens on the agency that it could not meet, which in turn con-
tributed to the perception of regulatory failure). At some level, the distrust of agencies and the
preference for judicial constraints on agency action seems to be a fundamental part of the American
political and legal culture. See Mashaw, supra note 4, at 231 ("As a nation we are committed to
judicial control of agency action.").
122. Competition between the White House and the Capitol for influence over the federal bureau-
cracy has led to increased oversight and micromanagementby both branches. See Shapiro, supra note
44, at 24-26. Such oversight has manifested itself in requirements that agencies provide detailed analy-
sis of their policies to OMB or the courts. See Lazarus, supra note 121, at 330-40 (noting how distrust
of the EPA by both the President and Congress has led to increased oversight by both branches).
123. See, e.g., H.R. 926, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing that agencies be required to prepare
flexibility and regulatory impact analyses for all major rules, subjecting flexibility analyses to judicial
review and regulatory impact analyses to OMB review, and providing minimum time periods for com-
ments to proposed rules and an opportunity for response to comments); S. 291, 104th Cong. (1995)
(proposing similar measures regarding flexibility and impact analyses and requiring that agencies pre-
pare risk assessments prior to adopting rules); S. 592, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995) (increasing the substan-
tive burden OSHA would be required to meet in order to promulgate workplace health standards).
124. See B. GuY PETERS, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY 139 (3d ed. 1989) (noting
subordinates' ability to control and distort the information they pass on to their superiors); Wallace S.
Sayre, Dilemmas and Prospects of the Federal Government Service, in THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
SERVICE 1, 2 (Wallace S. Sayre ed., 2d ed. 1965); see also DOUGLAS YATES, BUREAUCRATIC
DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRACYAND EFFICIENCY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 132 (1982)
(asserting that the "force of [guild-like] professionalism is diminished by conflict among various
professional groups over the shape and substance of policy").
125. The outcome of the regulatory process may also be skewed by an agency staff's identification
of a particular interest group as its "client." See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND
PUBLJC POLICIES 36 (1984) (characterizing bureaucrats' relationships with client interest groups as a
resource that an agency staff can manipulate to influence policy); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY:
WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do IT 84-86 (1989) (contending that recent
1997] Demystifying Deossification
The rulemaking process at the EPA illustrates how, without the influ-
ence of aggressive judicial review, proposed rules and the analyses that
accompany them to the agency head tend to reflect the perspective of the
program office within the agency responsible for the substantive regulatory
area governed by the rule." This "lead office" provides the impetus for
internal development of a rule, and writes the first draft of a proposed
rule.127 Other offices at the agency then become involved in the rule-
making by participating in a "working group" responsible for developing
the proposed rule that will be forwarded to heads of the various offices and
ultimately will be published in the Federal Register." Because these
offices are not directly responsible for the rule, however, they have little
inherent institutional interest in ensuring that the rule that the Administrator
ultimately adopts is sound. 29 And, without the need to convince an out-
side reviewer, like a judge, of the rule's wisdom in light of data available
to the agency, a lead agency has little reason to slow down the rulemaking
process to address the concerns raised by a working group." Thus,
without the threat of aggressive judicial review, one would expect rules to
reflect the lead office's perceived need for the regulation.
The perspective of the lead office, however, may be very parochial or
biased towards special interests. In traditional regulatory agencies, which
regulate a single industry, staff members in the lead office may come
efforts to grant a multitude of interest groups access to agency staff makes capture by a single interest
group more difficult).
126. Although the internal procedures leading to a rule differ from agency to agency, focusing on
EPA procedures allows one to get a good feel for how rules can reflect an office's idiosyncratic per-
spectives. First, the team model of rulemaking that is prevalent at the EPA is not unique to that
agency. See McGarity, Internal Structure, supra note 59, at 90 (describing the team model as a general
procedural approach to rulemaking). Second, the commentary deriding judicial review for its ossifying
impact has identified the EPA as an agency for which the costs of ossification have been considerable.
See McGarity, supra note 2, at 1414 (noting that the EPA's rulemaking efforts were among those most
frequently "hamstrung" by hard look review). Thus, if relaxing the hard look test is of questionable
net value for deossifying EPA rulemaking, it is unlikely to be of great value in other contexts.
127. See Sanford E. Gaines, Decisionnaking Procedures at the Environmental Protection Agency,
62 IOWA L. REV. 839, 843 (1977); cf McGarity, Internal Structure, supra note 59, at 72 (noting that
the creation of a working group occurs after approval of the lead office's "start action request," and
that at this stage "the ball is in the program [i.e., lead] office's court").
128. See Gaines, supra note 127, at 843; McGarity, Internal Structure, supra note 59, at 73-76.
My analysis focuses on the "team model" of rulemaking. Agencies may use other models, but these
are not any more likely to result in efficient procedures that lead to wise rules. See McGarity, Internal
Structure, supra note 59, at 94-107 (reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of various internal
rulemaking models).
129. See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
56 (1975) (quoting a senior EPA official who wrote in a memo to the author that "[w]orking [giroups
really do very little except carp, and protect what they perceive to be their interests"); cf. Gaines, supra
note 127, at 843 (noting that the lead agency has primary responsibility for a rule and performs most
of the work on the rule even after the working group is formed).
130. See Pedersen, supra note 129, at 59.
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directly from employment in the industry, or at least share the professional
background of their industry compatriots.' Rules coming out of such
offices are prone to further the interests of the regulated industry. Such
capture poses less of a threat within agencies created to protect the public
against harms that cut across industries. Staff members in lead offices at
such agencies, however, may still share a unique regulatory ethic. 32
Such an ethic may take root because most of the staff in the lead office
come from a similar professional background.133 It may arise because
the office attracts individuals zealously committed to alleviating harms that
fall within the office's regulatory jurisdiction." Or, the ethic might
derive from the office's institutional role within the agency. 35
Regardless of how the lead office's ethic is created, if unchecked by other
staff it can lead to rules that do not reflect a consensus view of the public
interest.
A study of the EPA's water effluent standards for corn wet milling
plants illustrates the propensity for an agency to ignore input from staff
members outside the lead office. The EPA initiated the corn wet milling
131. See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 103 (1992) (noting that an agency's need for expertise leads the
agency to draw regulators from industry); cf. PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL
REGULATORY AGENCIES 19 (1981) (asserting that administrative agencies may be biased towards special
interests because agency officials hope "to seek industry employment and will therefore be inclined to
use the office to build a store of goodwill with industry").
132. See Seidenfeld, supra note 40, at 1555; see also CHARLES T. GOODSELL, THE CASE FOR
BUREAUCRACY: A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION POLEMIC 131-32 (2d ed. 1985) (noting that administrators
follow professional norms); Carl J. Friedrich, Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative
Responsibility, I PUB. POL'Y 3, 12-17 (1940) (pointing out that administrators have technical as well
as legal and political standards of responsibilities).
133. See David Goetze, The Shaping ofEnvironmentalAttitudes in Air Pollution Control Agencies,
41 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 423, 428-29 (1981) (concluding that environmental attitudes exhibited by em-
ployees of state pollution control agencies are affected by the employees' professional backgrounds and
internal agency processes); Macey, supra note 131, at 103-04 (noting that professional background and
sources of information affect experts' perspectives on regulation); Charles Pruitt, People Doing What
They Do Best: The Professional Engineers and NHTSA, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 363,366, 365-66 (1979)
(noting that the numerical dominance of engineers at NHTSA resulted in a technical and mechanical
research "independence" from the auto industry and from such politically crucial factors as "consumer
acceptance and protection from unwarranted costs"). For an extensive discussion of how and why pro-
fessional norms affect bureaucrats' behavior, see WILSON, supra note 125, at 59-65.
134. See Jeremy Rabkin, Office for Civil Rights, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 304, 333
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980); WILSON, supra note 125, at 67 (both noting that the Office for Civil
Rights's propensity to attract officials with considerable enthusiasm for the agency's mission contributed
to its pushing activist interpretations of the civil rights statutes it enforces).
135. See MARCUS, supra note 63, at 107-12 (describing the different perspectives of various
offices at the EPA); Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, 9 LAW & POL'Y 355,
373-74 (1987) (observing that agency socialization may be more important than the regulator's back-
ground in determining her role in a regulatory culture); see also SAMUEL KRISLOV & DAVID H.
ROSENBLOOM, REPRESENTATIVEBUREAUCRACYAND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 118-19 (1981)
(noting that bureaucrats are often "socialized" to take on the viewpoint of the clientele they serve in
their official capacities); WILSON, supra note 125, at 36-49 (demonstrating how immediate tasks facing
government officials affect their attitudes and behavior).
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rulemaking proceeding in 1972,136 at which time most courts had not
adopted the hard look gloss on arbitrary and capricious review.13 7  The
EPA contracted out the job of initially collecting data about water pollution
from such plants, and the contractor drafted a preliminary standard that set
limits on effluent averaged over one- and thirty-day periods.1 3  The data
to support the standard, however, were woefully inadequate; in particular
the contractor had collected only long-term average effluent measurements
for the entire industry, which indicated little about the ranges of such
effluent over one- or thirty-day periods. 139  The project officer, who was
from the lead office, lacked the expertise to recognize that the data did not
support the preliminary standard, so he decided to proceed using the con-
tractor's suggested standard as the basic rulemaking proposal.1" The
standard was then reviewed by a working group, which identified the diffi-
cuties with the standard, but the working group's concerns were ig-
nored. 41 In 1974, the EPA adopted a final standard very similar to the
contractor's initial proposal. 42 The appellate court applied hard look
review to these rules and, not surprisingly, remanded for lack of sufficient
support. 43
Of course one cannot be certain that EPA awareness of the hard look
standard would have cured the problems with this rulemaking. 1  But at
least the hard look test would have given the bureaucracy within the agency
an incentive to take seriously criticisms of a proposed rule by staff
136. See Gaines, supra note 127, at 849.
137. In 1971, the Supreme Court had just laid the predicates for hard look review of informal
action in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). Only the D.C.
Circuit had previously utilized the hard look test, which Judge Leventhal first announced in Greater
Boston Television v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In 1972, even the D.C. Circuit was
struggling with the issue of whether the courts should merely specify agency procedures rather than
demand that the substance of the agency decision be reasonable in light of the record on review. See
Rabin, supra note 3, at 1306-08; Wald, supra note 99, at 138-39 (both describing the debate between
Judges Leventhal and Bazelon regarding whether courts should engage in close substantive scrutiny of
agency decisions or merely specify procedures for agencies to follow in particular cases).
138. See Gaines, supra note 127, at 852-53.
139. See id. at 852-53.
140. See id. at 855.
141. See id. at 855-56.
142. Grain Mills Point Source Category, 39 Fed. Reg. 10512 (1974).
143. See CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1049 (8th Cir. 1975).
144. McGarity alludes to the fact that the Eighth Circuit reversed the rule a second time even after
the EPA had responded to the first remand by bolstering its record supporting the rule. McGarity,
supra note 2, at 1416. He thus cites this rulemaking as an example of judicial overreaching that
contributes to ossification. Id. at 1416-17. Another detailed account of this rulemaking, however,
concludes that even after remand the position of the Agency was so entrenched that the Agency failed
to correct the problems originally identified by the working group. Gaines, supra note 127, at 862-63.
The key benefit of hard look review is its ability to get the agency to take concerns of perspectives
outside the lead office seriously early in the development of a rule.
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members outside the lead office.145 Without such incentives, the ultimate
decisionmaker may never be aware that a rule has problems, or what op-
tions she has in light of those problems.
This analysis thus reveals an intrinsic tension between the ossification
of rulemaking stemming from judicial unwillingness to defer to agency ex-
pertise and the benefits that flow from judicial demands for comprehensive
analysis of a rule. Relaxing hard look review of rulemaking can relieve
uncertainty about whether a court will second-guess the agency's expertise
and might help to deossify rulemaking by reducing an agency's propensity
to obtain independent analyses by various staff offices or outside groups.
But any such gain comes at a price: Hard look review encourages agencies
to obtain and coordinate input from various professional perspectives.1"
By doing so, hard look review discourages rules that reflect a biased or
parochial view of the public interest. Thus, relaxing hard look review to
reduce uncertainty about attitudes towards agency expertise directly under-
cuts a significant benefit that flows from such review.
B. Uncertainty About the Significance of Issues Raised in a Rulemaking
Proceeding
Lawyers thrive on applying critical reasoning skills to cases, and
judges, who usually come from the ranks of successful lawyers, are there-
fore well qualified to spot logical weaknesses in arguments and gaps in
reasoning."4l But without the technical background of professionals
within an agency, judges often cannot ascertain the extent to which such
weaknesses and flaws undermine the efficacy of a complex regulatory pro-
gram. This is especially true for agency rulemaking, for in the rulemaking
context courts confront arguments about the impact of factors in the
abstract. In judicial challenges to rules, unlike enforcement proceedings,
145. See Pedersen, supra note 129, at 60 (noting that judicial opinions inquiring into the minute
details of rulemaking "give those who care about well-documented and well-reasoned decisionmaking
a lever with which to move those who do not"); cf. James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in
THE POLITICS OF REGULATION, supra note 134, at 381 ("As outside groups ... hired economists and
scientists to challenge EPA decisions, the power of scientists and economists within EPA grew.").
146. See Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property, 93 COLUM. L.
REv. 1668, 1711-12 (1993) (noting how NEPA's requirement that agencies identify and consider envi-
ronmental impacts forced agencies to include environmental experts in the agency decisionmaking
process).
147. See William Warfield Ross, Components of an Adequate Record, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN
COLLABORATION: RESOLVING REGULATORY ISSUES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 23, 31 (J.D.
Nyhart & Milton M. Carrow eds., 1983) (asserting that appellatejudges can perform hard look review
of scientific issues because the skill required is not "a working familiarity with . . . scientific fields"
but rather "sufficient familiarity with scientific method to be able to follow and evaluate the analytic
processes used by the agency in its decision"); Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review of Economic
Analyses, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 43, 54 (1983) (stating that ensuring that an agency's conclusions actually




neither agencies nor opponents of their rules have data reflecting direct
experience with the agency standard.14 Faced with conflicting assertions
about whether an ancillary issue affects the efficacy or cost of a rule, a
court applying the hard look requirement that the agency carefully consider
all relevant factors has little choice but to assume that the issue is
significant and to demand that the agency present studies showing that the
rule is justified despite the concerns of the commenters.
So long as one retains a commitment to meaningful judicial review of
agencies' reasoning processes, however, easing the stringency of the hard
look test will not eliminate the prospect that a court will deem a marginal
issue to be significant. Indiscriminately relaxing the standard of judicial
review cannot affect a judge's ability to distinguish truly important issues
from those that are not significant. To the extent that courts demand
logical and factually supported reasoning as the basis for an agency deci-
sion, the agency will have to perform significant analyses even under a
relaxed standard of review. Under a relaxed standard, an agency may at-
tempt to argue that further analysis of a contested issue is unwarranted
because the issue is not sufficiently important. But even allowing the
agency this leeway will not relieve it of the burden of having to support its
assertion that the issue is not significant.149 An analysis of the impor-
tance of an issue will itself be costly. More significantly, a court might
discredit this secondary analysis. Hence, the agency will still face
uncertainty about what issues the reviewing court will find significant. A
corollary to this conclusion is that courts cannot eliminate such uncertainty
by merely increasing the level of deference to agency decisions without
entirely abdicating their review of the agency reasoning process.
Courts could alleviate this uncertainty by abandoning meaningful
review of the decisionmaking process altogether. Several commentators
have advocated such abandonment, arguing for ex-post political oversight
of agency decisionmaking instead.1" Ex-post political oversight of
agency decisions, properly structured, does provide an important check
against runaway agencies and a partial check on agency capture.'
Congress or the White House is likely to react if the outcome of an agency
148. See MASRAW & HARFST, supra note 1, at 245-46 (advocating the delay of judicial review
of rules until they are enforced in a particular context as a means of makingjudicial review less abstract
and of giving the courts information about compliance costs and feasibility).
149. Justice Breyer made much the same point when he wrote: "The reason agencies do not
explore all arguments or consider all alternatives is one of practical limits of time and resources. Yet,
to have to explain and to prove all this to a reviewing court risks imposing much of the very burden
that not considering alternatives aims to escape." Breyer, supra note 54, at 393.
150. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 19, at 457; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional
and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEXAs L. REv. 469, 520-25 (1985).
151. See Seidenfeld, supra note 40, at 1568, 1572-74.
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rulemaking imposes substantial burdens on any well-organized interest
group. Experience with political oversight, however, suggests that one
must temper any optimism about the capacity of political review to improve
the agency decisionmaking process.152 Political checks that purport to
seek a better rulemaking process are usually hidden means of influencing
rulemaking outcomes.153 Thus it is not surprising that under President
Reagan, OMB in practice exempted rules aimed at deregulation from the
rigorous requirements of Executive Order No. 12,291," which man-
dated that rules be cost justified.155 Similarly, the Republican Congress's
efforts to require agencies to perform more analyses before adopting new
rules or implementing existing ones is a thinly veiled attempt simply to
hinder imposition of regulatory requirements that agencies might impose
on industry.56 The reason for the focus of political review on outcome
is simple: Politics is driven by the bottom line. Although this focus on
outcome is not inherently bad, it does limit the effectiveness of political
oversight as a means of encouraging improved agency decisionmaking
processes.
Reliance on political oversight alone also raises the prospect of agency
rules driven by immediate political concerns. The hard look mandate that
an agency think carefully about all relevant issues discourages an agency
from rashly appeasing short term political pressures by cutting deals that
ignore the interests of those without political clout. 57 Instead, the
agency at least will have to consider all affected interests, even if only to
provide some reason for treating each issue as it did. On occasion, deci-
sions may arise that an agency cannot justify by acceptable rationales; for
these, making the agency state reasons for its decision may prevent it from
152. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 44, at 39 (explainingpolitical oversight as a competition between the
White House and Capitol Hill for influence over agency policy that has not resulted in "more
democracy or better regulatory policy").
153. See Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the
Environmental Protection Agency, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 127, 179-84, 189-94
(arguing that OMB oversight of EPA rulemaking cannot be explained as a means of coordinating or
improving the process of agency decisionmaking); Seidenfeld, supra note 108, at 11-12,21 (contending
that congressional and presidential oversight facilitates outcomes that serve special interest groups).
154. 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982), revoked by Exec. Order No.
12866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
155. See McGARiTY, RATIONALITy, supra note 59, at 69-70; Oliver A. Houck, President Xand
the New (Approved) Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 540 (1987); Percival, supra note 153,
at 150.
156. See Verkuil, supra note 19, at 454 (noting that proposed legislation requiring agencies to
perform risk assessment prior to adopting rules "seems designed as much to stymie as to refocus the
rulemaking process').
157. See Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM.
U. L. REV. 491, 517 & n.120 (1987); Seidenfeld, supra note 108, at 24-25; Sunstein, supra note 43,
at 211 (all noting that, absent judicial review, agencies are likely to tailor their policies to serve the
needs of powerful special interests).
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reaching the regulatory outcome it initially favored.158 In such cases, the
hard look test might prompt the agency to think creatively about regulatory
approaches that will adequately respect all affected interests.
For example, despite arguments that judicial review would paralyze
FERC's deregulation of electric generation and transmission, hard look
review of FERC deregulation may have stimulated FERC's use of a cre-
ative regulatory approach. Richard Pierce has vociferously criticized the
District of Columbia Circuit for its repeated remand of FERC's rules that
attempt to impose an open access to natural gas pipelines.'59 According
to Pierce, the court's holdings that FERC failed adequately to address the
costs of transition to a market based system were both unfounded and
counterproductive.I" Pierce predicted that these cases would discourage
FERC from pushing the wholesale provision of electricity towards a com-
petitive market system."'
Contrary to Pierce's prediction, FERC did not abdicate its responsi-
bility to deregulate electricity. Its difficulty with persuading the courts that
it had adequately addressed transition costs when deregulating natural gas,
however, may have convinced FERC that deregulation of an entire industry
is best begun using a case-by-case approach. Hence, FERC initially
avoided rulemaking efforts to deregulate electric generation and transmis-
sion in favor of conditioning approval of utilities' applications for mergers
and market-based rates on the applicants providing competing generators
access to their transmission grids. 62 Such conditions allow FERC to
tailor transmission access and market-based rates to take into account the
magnitude and distribution of transition costs in particular markets. In
addition, by attaching mandates that utilities move to a competitive system
as conditions on approvals desired by utilities, FERC has mollified the
electric industry's opposition to deregulation. Finally, the judicial focus
on transition costs presaged congressional concern about the same issue.
Congress has even taken steps to prevent FERC from attaching deregula-
tory conditions on utility companies' applications for mergers and rate
approvals when the transition costs created by those conditions are likely
to fall heavily on these utilities' existing customers."6 Had FERC issued
158. Cf. JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY35-36 (1983)
(arguing that norms against asserting self-interest to justify political outcomes foster outcomes that serve
some conception of the public interest).
159. Pierce, supra note 1, at 21-26.
160. Id. at 18-22.
161. Id. at 18-19.
162. See Entergy Servs., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. 61234 (1992), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.,
Cajun Elec. Power Coop. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Rossi, supra note 1, at
794-99.
163. See Rossi, supra note 1, at 796 (noting that the Energy Policy Act of 1992 contained pro-
visions "intended to protect native load customers"). For example, the Energy Policy Act of 1992
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a rule ordering such deregulation across the board, it might have prompted
a congressional response that would have scuttled deregulation entirely.
Thus, by prompting FERC to take transition costs seriously, the D.C.
Circuit encouraged the agency to use a regulatory approach that allowed
for more flexible and acceptable means of allocating transition costs. 16
In short, hard look review performs a valuable function by encour-
aging agencies to think through the full implications of their policies.
Abandoning meaningful judicial review altogether, in contrast, encourages
policies that react to short term political preferences of powerful interest
groups. Taking a middle course by relaxing hard look review while main-
taining meaningful review would compromise the impact of hard look re-
view without doing much to relieve the uncertainty about courts attaching
significance to peripheral issues.
Ossification, however, is not a foregone conclusion. Some operational
modifications to hard look review could reduce this uncertainty without
forfeiting the hard look test's encouragement of careful consideration of
important issues. Courts could rely on entities with greater knowledge or
greater democratic legitimacy to flag those issues that merit the rigors of
the hard look approach. To the extent that an agency can identify these
flags before it makes its decision, it will have a better indication of the
issues on which courts will press it.
Entities likely to have greater knowledge than the courts about the
significance of issues raised by an agency-proposed rule include those that
make the effort to get involved in the rulemaking proceeding." Such
entities usually are substantially affected by the proposed rule and therefore
requires FERC to terminate or modify an order requiring a utility to provide transmission for another
generator of electricity if "the ordered transmission services require enlargement of transmission
capacity and the transmitting utility subject to the order has failed, after making a good faith effort, to
obtain the necessary approvals or property rights under applicable Federal, State and local laws." 16
U.S.C. § 824j(d)(1)(C) (1994). In effect, this provision allows state and local regulatory entities to
block major FERC wheeling orders.
164. Cf. Rossi, supra note 1, at 809-10 (hypothesizing that hard look review may have played a
part in prompting states and Congress to push for deregulation of the electric utility industry). Having
gained some experience with issues relating to transition costs in particular markets, FERC recently
adopted a rule governing open access to utilities' electric transmission facilities, in which it authorized
utilities to recover "legitimate, prudent and verifiable standard costs" caused by their having to provide
transmission for other power generation. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540,21628 (1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts.
35 & 385); see also Jim Rossi, Can the FERC Overcome Special Interest Politics?, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Oct. 15, 1995, at 3 1. FERC explicitly acknowledged that judicial concerns with transition costs caused
by the agency's earlier deregulation of the natural gas industry and by FERC's decisions allowing par-
ticular power companies to charge market rates helped guide the agency's resolution of the stranded
cost issue. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21630-32.
165. See CORNELIUSM. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND
MAKE POLICY 162 (1994) (noting that public participation in rulemaking provides the agency with
substantive information as well as an indication of the acceptability of a proposed rule).
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may have direct experience that bears on the rule's efficacy or cost.1"
That these entities have taken the trouble of contacting the agency prior to
the development of a proposed rule or of submitting comments after the
agency publishes the notice indicates that they have made some investment
in becoming infbrmed. 6 7 Courts can reduce uncertainty about the signif-
icance of issues relating to a rule by refraining from raising sua sponte
issues that commenters in the rulemaking proceeding did not themselves
squarely bring before the agency.
Psychologically, judges might have difficulty ignoring issues they
believe to be germane to the validity of a rule: having envisioned a poten-
tially detrimental effect of a rule, judges naturally would seek some
reassurance from the agency that this effect will not ensue. If, however,
the agency has no notice at the time of its decision that the court will
consider the issue significant, and therefore glosses over the issue, the only
opportunity for the agency to provide such reassurance is on remand. To
avoid the risk of remand because the court, without warning, identifies an
issue as significant, the agency must fully address every potentially relevant
issue. Thus, allowing courts to quell their fears by identifying issues on
which the agency was not asked to focus places a burden on the agency to
analyze every issue relevant to its rule. To avoid ossification, reviewing
courts must resist the temptation to raise problems that the interested
parties did not bring to the agency's attention.
Interested parties, unfortunately, are just that; those parties opposed
to an agency rule have every incentive to raise every issue and introduce
every factor that undercuts the agency's decision. 68 Moreover, they
have an interest in portraying every such issue as significant.169 Hence,
courts cannot blindly rely on commenters' characterizations of an issue as
important; they need some reliable signal that the affected entities actually
166. See Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 791, 802-03 (1994) (noting that the EPA will need to enlist industry in generating data on
pollution and the efficacy of particular regulatory mechanisms); Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents
of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 655, 663
(noting that regulators depend on the industries they regulate for "reliable information about the effect
of various regulatory policies on industry performance").
167. Public input into the rulemaking process generally is more important and influential when the
agency is developing the proposed rule, prior to publication of the notice of rulemaking that technically
"kicks off" the informal rulemaking proceeding. See Elliot, supra note 14, at 1495.
168. Interested persons who participate in a rulemaking have such incentives because they view
rulemaking as an adversarial process and notice and comment proceedings as a means of creating a
record to support their contentions in subsequent lawsuits challenging the rule. See Philip J. Harter,
Negotiating Regulations:A CureforMalaise, 71 GEo. L.J. 1, 20-21 (1982) (noting that the adversarial
nature of rulemaking leads parties to take positions in which they do not believe and to overstate their
case); Robert B. Reich, Regulation by Confrontation or Negotiation?, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June
198 1, at 82, 85 (contending that lawyers who represent interested parties in administrative proceedings
manipulate procedures by raising contentions that are not central to the issues in controversy).
169. See Pierce, supra note 13, at 310.
1997]
Texas Law Review
do consider the issue to be as important as they say." One such signal
would be an investment by a commenter in that entity's own collection and
analyses of data. Presumably, an entity would not decide to make such an
investment unless it believed the resulting data would ultimately provide
substantial support for its position. Without such a signal, courts should
decline to credit a commenter's characterization of an issue as important.
This limitation on the issues a reviewing court seriously considers would
raise the cost to interested parties of commenting on each issue, and
discourage them from merely submitting a laundry list of concerns about
a proposed rule. The limitation would also'encourage interested parties to
submit comments that focus the agency's attention on those issues that the
parties consider most significant, thereby preventing entities from
"sandbagging" agencies by failing to emphasize a concern they have with
a proposed rule until their brief on judicial review.
Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation,1 which dealt with
an early controversy generated by NHTSA's attempt to require airbags in
automobiles, illustrates how courts might have used signalling by affected
entities to determine whether an issue they raise in a rule challenge truly
is significant." 2  In Chrysler, the court upheld NHTSAs authority to
promulgate an auto safety standard that, in effect, required automobile
manufacturers to install airbags in new cars. The standard specified
allowable effects of crashes on test dummies, and the court upheld the
substantive standard. 73 The court, however, reversed the rule because
the agency had failed to specify completely the standards regulating the
construction of test dummies. The court agreed with auto manufacturers
that test results might differ because of the variability of test dummies, and
therefore that the standard did not comport with the statutory requirement
that it be "objective."174 In so doing, the majority's concern for fairness
to manufacturers who faced potential liability for violating the standard led
it to read into the statute a degree of objectivity that was neither pragmatic
nor seemingly intended by Congress. 75
170. For a general discussion of the theory of signalling, see BAIRD, supra note 115, at 122-56.
171. 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).
172. For a general description of the airbag controversy that led to the Chrysler decision and the
ramifications of the court's holding, see MAs-AW & HARFST, supra note 1, at 87-95, 121-23.
173. Chrysler, 472 F.2d at 674-75.
174. Id. at 675-78.
175. According to the dissent, the majority ignored a distinction Congress drew between safety
standards, which the statute required to be objective, and procedures for testing compliance with such
standards, which did not have to be objective. The dissent believed that the specification of test
dummies described a testing device rather than a specification of the standard itself. Id. at 683-88
(Miller, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent pointed out that the majority's restrictive definition of
objectivity-requiring that tests be capable of decisively demonstrating conclusions without any
necessity for human judgment-placed an unrealistic barrier in the way of NHTSA's adoption of safety
standards generally. Id. at 688-89; see also MAsHAW & HARFST, supra note 1, at 90-91 (commenting
that "a performance test that requires no engineering judgment is an impossibility").
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The court's focus on the objectivity of the standard took the agency
by surprise, and it is readily accepted today that the issue of crash test
dummy specification was not central to the industry's concerns about the
rule.176 Had the court looked for signals from the industry, it would
have realized that the issue was tangential to the controversy. General
Motors had indicated, in its comments, that it could comply with the stan-
dard by the deadline established in NHTSA's rule."r GM did so because
it was farther along in developing airbags and felt that it could gain a
competitive advantage from NHTSA's passive restraint standard. Had the
specification of test dummies, however, actually been a significant impedi-
ment to development of an airbag system that would meet NHTSA's stan-
dard, GM would not have known it could meet the standard. In that case,
GM would not have had any incentive to assert it could meet the standard,
as this assertion would encourage NHITSA to adopt a standard that later
might subject GM to significant liability. Thus, judicial sensitivity to the
need for signals about which issues in a rulemaking are truly significant
might have avoided the deleterious impact its remand had on the future of
NHTSA's regulatory program.17
Agency staff is another group likely to possess better information than
the courts about whether an issue raised in a rulemaking truly is signif-
icant. If some staff members within an agency express concerns about the
agency's cursory dismissal of an issue, that might indicate to a reviewing
court that the issue is significant. For courts to make a practice of
scrutinizing internal communications of agency staff in search of dissen-
sion, however, would almost certainly do more harm than good. On the
one hand, such scrutiny would discourage the agency from allowing its
staff to communicate openly and honestly among themselves for fear that
a court would parlay discussion into a reason to doubt the agency reso-
lution of an issue. 79 On the other hand, some disgruntled staff members
could sabotage an agency rulemaking by voicing dissent, knowing that this
would obligate the agency to perform full-fledged studies of any issues they
raised. The result would then be increased ossification.
176. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 1, at 90-91.
177. Id. at 90.
178. For a description of the impact of the Chrysler decision on NHTSA's efforts to set a passive
restraint standard, and more generally on NHTSA's auto safety program, see id. at 92-93.
179. See McGarity, supra note 53, at 1327-28 (1987) (noting that allowing courts to use infor-
mation in regulatory analyses as a basis to question agency decisions would deform the deliberative
process of creating such analyses and may induce agencies to avoid preparing such analyses);
Regulatory Procedures Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 746Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law
and Government of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 891 (1981) (prepared statement of
David A. Clanton, Acting Chairman, Federal Trade Commission) (stating that "analyses would be
considerably less candid and, consequently, less useful for their intended purposes, if they were subject
to adversarial attack in litigation").
1997]
Texas Law Review
If, however, the agency itself credited the staff's concern by ad-
dressing it seriously in an official decision, then the court should take note.
In essence, a court could view an agency's expression of concern about the
importance of an issue under a variant of the hard look requirement that
the agency act consistently. An agency should not be free to deem an issue
important in the context of one decision, and then claim it is insignificant
in the context of another. The agency should have to consider the issue
carefully in the second context as well, unless it could show that the
differing context, changed circumstances, or new data support its conten-
tion that the issue was no longer of consequence."
The State Farm decision illustrates how courts can rely on signals
from the agency itself to identify issues warranting analysis. In 1970,
NH TSA amended its standard governing seatbelts in automobiles, adopting
a passive restraint standard that in effect mandated that manufacturers
install airbags.' Seven years later, the agency explicitly allowed
manufacturers the choice of using automatic seatbelts instead of
airbags."e In 1981, following the election of President Reagan, NHTSA
reversed its position and concluded that detachable automatic seatbelts
would not be effective because it predicted that car occupants frequently
would disable them."s Instead of returning to the airbags-only require-
ment implicit in the 1970 standard, however, the agency simply revoked
its passive restraint standard without even discussing the airbags-only
option.'"4 The Supreme Court reversed NHTSAs 1981 decision on the
grounds that NHTSAs previous implicit conclusion that airbags provided
an effective restraint system obligated the agency to consider the airbags-
only option."'4 The Court properly found the agency's failure to address
the issue to be arbitrary and capricious even though commenters appear not
to have suggested this option to NHTSA.
Congress is a third group to which reviewing courts should look to
determine whether an issue warrants detailed attention by the agency.
Although members of Congress themselves may not have much more tech-
nical appreciation for a regulatory matter than do judges, congressional
180. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
181. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection in Passenger Vehicles,
Multipurpose Passenger Vehicles, Trucks, and Buses, 35 Fed. Reg. 16927 (1970); see also Inflatable
Occupant Restraint Systems, 34 Fed. Reg. 11148 (1969) (proposing the passive restraint standard and
explaining NHTSA's expectation that manufacturers would meet it by installing airbag restraint
systems).
182. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Restraint Systems, 42 Fed. Reg. 34289,
34296-97 (1977).
183. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 46 Fed. Reg. 21172,
21176 (1981).
184. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 46 Fed. Reg. 53419
(1981).
185. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48-49 (1983).
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staff members tend to be knowledgeable about regulatory issues.186
Hence, one should consider Congress, as an institution, to have some ex-
pertise about the significance of an issue. Moreover, the perceived signifi-
cance of many regulatory issues often reflects political value judgments
rather than technical assessments."s  In fact, the legitimacy of the
bureaucratic state as a source of regulatory standards depends on a pre-
sumption of legislative supremacy.188 Thus, even if the legislature leaves
resolution of the details of regulation to an agency, if the agency's
authorizing statute prescribes that it look to certain factors to guide its
decision, the agency has no legitimate power to give those factors short
shrift.
Brae Corp. v. United States..9 provides a good illustration of how
a court can use congressional direction to determine the relevance of issues
raised by an agency decision. In Brae, the court first upheld an Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) decision to deregulate all rates charged by
a single railroad for freight transported by boxcar. The court relied on
clear congressional intent to encourage the ICC to deregulate such rates to
the extent possible."9 The court, however, reversed the ICC decision
also to deregulate joint rates-rates divided between two railroads. The
ICC had relied on the same type of generic data to conclude that railroads
would not overcharge shippers with such rates. The ICC, however, had
failed to address the possibility that larger railroads would exploit their
monopoly power over short-haul carriers with whom they participated in
joint rates to appropriate the profits resulting from any efficiencies of such
small carriers. The court suggested that the ICC's failure to address this
possibility might not have been arbitrary and capricious in the abstract, but
became so because of clear congressional concern about larger railroads'
abilities to interfere with the financial well-being of smaller, spur
railroads."'
186. According to one account, a congressional committee's "professional staff are [the] eyes and
ears for the committee leadership in relations with the bureaucracy." JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING
A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 80 (1990); see also WILLIAM J.
KEEFE & MORRIs S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES 169
(6th ed. 1985) (noting the congressional staff's role in enabling Congress to deal with the executive
branch without being dependent on agencies for information regarding regulatory programs).
187. See Seidenfeld, supra note 40, at 1520; Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the
APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 281 (1986).
188. See Seidenfeld, supra note 40, at 1548 ("[T]he Constitution grants [policymaking primacy]
to Congress as the body of duly elected representatives of the people.'). It is precisely the recognition
that regulation was political as well as technical that led scholars of the administrative state to abandon
the expertise model of agency decisionmaking. Id. at 1518-20.
189. 740 F.2d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
190. Id. at 1043.
191. Id. at 1051. In suggesting that courts follow congressional direction to determine which
issues warrant full regulatory analysis, I have avoided discussing the evidence on which courts should
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C Uncertainty About the Sufficiency of Agency Analyses
The last type of uncertainty engendered by hard look review results
from an agency's inability to predict the depth of analysis that a reviewing
court will find sufficient. Many of the problems created by the other
categories of uncertainty are greatly magnified because the agency does not
know when it can stop collecting additional data and stop analyzing a par-
ticular issue and still satisfy a reviewing court.192 To ensure against the
possibility of reversal, agencies engaged in rulemaking will collect data and
perform studies even when they believe that the cost and delay stemming
from these activities will exceed the value of the information the agencies
will derive from them.1" An agency engaged in rulemaking might even
perform analyses that it considered entirely superfluous to the process of
discovering how best to structure the rule. Alternatively, the agency might
shun rulemaking altogether, hoping that resort to more informal means of
setting standards will relieve it of the burden of performing costly studies.
rely to discern Congress's concerns. What evidence courts may appropriately consult presents a thorny
question. Many scholars have discussed problems of legitimacy raised by judicial reliance on legisla-
five history without supporting statutory language. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative
History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365 (1990) (outlining and critiquing scholars' views of the legit-
imacy and affect of judicial use of legislative history); see also, e.g., George A. Costello, Average
Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor
Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 60-72; Frank H. Easterbrook,
What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 441, 446-47 (1990). Such problems
are compounded by the fact that legislative histories can contain so much conflicting evidence from
which a court can pick and choose that such histories alone might be insufficient to put the agency on
notice that the court will deem an issue to require extended analysis. See Patricia M. Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV.
195, 214 (1983) (noting judges' ability to pick out parts of legislative history). The problems,
however, are less crucial than for controversies centering on pure statutory interpretation because the
court would be using the legislative history merely to identify significant controversial issues that
warrant agency attention; the court would not be prescribing substantive statutory mandates using lan-
guage on which the whole legislative body never voted. In any case, detailed analysis of this question
lies beyond the scope of this more general inquiry into deossification.
192. For examples of remands under hard look review that essentially required the agency to
collect additional factual support for its decision, see Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 768 F.2d
385, 393, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that the EPA failed to support its waiver of a Clean Air Act
provision because it did not have data on cars with 50,000 actual driving miles) and North Carolina
v. FERC, 584 F.2d 1003, 1015, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (remanding for FERC to gather and analyze
voluminous data to evaluate alternatives to FERC's natural gas priorities rule). For an example of a
case in which the court went out of its way to avoid a remand that would have required the agency to
collect additional data, see Trailways Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 766 F.2d 1537, 1544 n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(noting that the Commission's experience regarding the conduct of long distance bus companies obvi-
ated its need to perform a study on the long-term effects of permitting Greyhound to serve additional
routes). For additional examples of how the courts' current application of the arbitrary and capricious
test creates uncertainty about the extent to which agencies can rely on data not precisely on point, see
cases cited supra note 91.
193. See Harter, supra note 168, at 21 ("An agency... may feel compelled to compile a great
amount of factual material to counter other positions and to build affirmative cases, although such
information may be of only marginal value in making the ultimate decision.").
Demystifying Deossification
In either event, the agency is not acting efficiently to implement its
regulatory mandate.
The very uncertainty that causes the agency to perform overly detailed
studies, however, also provides a benefit. Judicial review may be the only
occasion for anyone outside the agency to inquire critically into the
agency's decisionmaking process.1" The only other outside institution
that looks at the details of this process is the Office of Management and
Budget, which brings its own biases to regulatory review.195 Under the
Reagan and Bush administrations, OMB demonstrated a propensity to avoid
serious inquiry into rules that reduced regulatory burdens on industry, and
to veto by inaction rules that promoted social goals at the expense of
industry regardless of whether they were cost justified.1" Moreover,
even if OMB were not institutionally biased, its cost-benefit-based review
focuses more on the bottom line of what a rule does than on the process
the agency uses to promulgate the rule.
Unlike the politically driven staff of OMB, judges are experienced in
spotting weaknesses in factual support and soft spots in logical reasoning.
Hence, courts are geared to ensure that an agency's decision is well
thought out. Given the pivotal role of judicial review, the easing of such
review is likely to give the agency flexibility, but only by allowing it to
adopt rules that the agency might be unable to justify upon careful analysis.
In short, the direct effect of easing the standard of review would likely be
not only decreased ossification, but also increased agency sloppiness.
Increasing the overall level of deference that courts give to agencies can
only relieve ossification at the expense of assurances of careful agency
deliberation.
There are, however, steps courts can take to reduce uncertainty about
the appropriate level of analysis without jeopardizing careful agency delib-
eration. The best approach might be to facilitate meaningful dialogue
between a court and an agency as part of the review process without im-
posing additional burdens of analysis on the agency. Critics might object
that the original cause of ossification was the judicial propensity to seek a
dialogue when the agency has neither the time nor the resources within its
regulatory agenda to do so. The real cause of ossification, however, has
not been simply too much dialogue, but rather unrealistic expectations by
courts about what the agency must bring to that dialogue, and a concom-
itant perception by agencies that more dialogue implies more detailed
194. See Pedersen, supra note 129, at 59 (arguing that, without external review, industry concerns
will not be given the attention they deserve).
195. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management ofAgency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 533, 552-53 (1989); Percival, supra note 153, at 181; Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Role of the President and 0MB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 181, 191-92 (1986).
196. See McGARITY, RATIONALITY, supra note 59, at 282-83, 286-87.
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analyses. The key to deossifying rulemaking without requiring courts to
abdicate their traditional review responsibilities is for the judiciary to invite
agencies to make their decisions about the extent of analysis that they
perform a part of the review dialogue.
Operationally, courts can extend this invitation by clarifying that the
hard look doctrine does not require the agency to collect data to support
every substantive conclusion it reaches. Hard look review should require
only that the agency carefully consider its decisions; in many cases, careful
consideration will indicate to an agency that time-consuming collection of
data and costly further analysis are unlikely to generate sufficient informa-
tional benefits to justify their costs. Of course, reviewing courts will have
to take a hard look to ensure that the agency is not simply mouthing con-
clusions about the cost of further study as an excuse to avoid careful
consideration of issues. Frequently, however, an agency will be able to
make a strong case based on existing information that further inquiry is of
dubious value. In such cases, allowing the agency the option of explaining
why detailed analysis is unwarranted will go a long way toward relieving
the delay and uncertainty generated by forcing the agency to collect all
relevant data and perform all relevant analyses. Courts should stress that
agencies have this option.
Judicial reversals that require agencies to collect more data and
perform more studies are perhaps the major contributors to agency fears
about judicial review. Such reversals thus greatly stimulate the appetites
of lawyers on agencies' staffs for overly detailed analyses. Hence, courts
should hesitate before remanding on grounds of insufficient factual support
for an agency decision. In particular, courts should defer to an agency's
determination that collection of additional data would be counter-productive
unless those challenging a rule can point to hard data that undermine the
agency's conclusion. Exceptions to such deference should be made only
in two instances: (1) when the court knows that the agency failed to con-
sider data that was available to it or that it could easily have obtained;"
or (2) when the potential detrimental ramifications of an agency decision
are so great compared to the potential harm that follows from not regu-
lating that an agency acts unreasonably by proceeding in the face of admit-
ted uncertainty.19'
197. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1030-31 (2d
Cir. 1983) (rejecting the Corps's EIS for failure adequately to compile information relating to the
impact of a proposed highway and urban renewal project on fisheries).
198. Such a case might arise, for instance, if the National Institutes of Health (NIH) approved the
release of newly developed genetically engineered bacteria knowing that the bacteria, once released into
the environment, might cause catastrophic harm. The NIH decision would be unreasonable if the
agency admitted the risk of uncertainty, but explained that further tests would be unable to determine
whether the organism, if released, is likely to cause such harm. Cf. Foundation on Econ. Trends v.
Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 152-55 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (reversing the NIH's approval of the release of genet-
ically engineered bacteria because the agency had not assessed the potential environmental impact of
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Demystifying Deossification
The Brae decision again illustrates how this approach might operate.
In Brae, petitioners challenged the ICC deregulation of all boxcar freight
rates, contending, among other things, that the ICC had insufficient support
for its decision.' The ICC had relied on general studies of the impact
of trucking on the market for boxcar freight and a detailed Conrail study
of boxcar shipping for classes of commodities in the northeastern United
States. Petitioners argued that the study aggregated classes of commodities
across goods that comprised separate shipping markets and that the market
in the Northeast was not representative of the market in all parts of the
country. Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit upheld the ICC, finding that the
data on which the agency relied, along with its general studies, were
sufficient to support its conclusion that railroads generally lacked monopoly
power over the shipment of goods by boxcar. Although the court recog-
nized that the ICC data did not show the absence of such power for all
markets throughout the country, the court noted that the petitioners had not
identified any market for which freight rates manifested such monopoly
power.' In essence, the court credited the agency for drawing reason-
able, albeit uncertain, conclusions from the data before it, and put the
burden on the petitioners to come forward with more particular data show-
ing that those conclusions were incorrect.
III. Conclusion
Critics of hard look review are on solid ground in concluding that
aggressive judicial review of agency reasoning has contributed to ossifi-
cation of the rulemaking process. Their assertion, however, that merely
easing the standard of review will deossify this process is more tenuous.
Hard look review encourages rulemaking paralysis because such re-
view creates three types of uncertainty about what agencies must do to
satisfy reviewing courts. First, hard look review raises doubts about
whether a court will defer to an agency's invocation of expertise to resolve
a rulemaking issue. Second, meaningful review of agency reasoning cre-
ates the possibility that the reviewing court will inflate the importance of
marginal issues in the rulemaking. Third, aggressive judicial review clouds
the agency's vision of the depth of analysis it must perform on each rule-
making issue.
Merely instructing courts to take a more deferential attitude in
reviewing agency reasoning in rulemaking, however, will not substantially
reduce these three types of uncertainty. Moreover, increasing overall
the release other than to conclude that the small number of bacteria released and natural processes
limiting the bacteria's survival made dispersal of the bacteria unlikely).
199. Brae Corp. v. United States, 740 F.2d 1023, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
200. Id. at 1042-43.
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deference to agency rulemaking will forfeit many of the benefits of hard
look review. A better approach to reforming judicial review would be to
specify operational modifications to how courts perform hard look review.
In particular, courts should look for signals from interested parties, the
regulators themselves, and Congress about what issues raised by a chal-
lenge to a rulemaking are significant. Also, courts should hesitate to
remand a rule for further development of data by the agency. If courts
modified hard look review according to these criteria, they might increase
the flexibility of the rulemaking process without encouraging sloppy or
nondeliberative agency decisionmaking.
